The Redistributional Impact of Non-linear Electricity Pricing by Severin Borenstein
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I am grateful to Koichiro Ito for excellent research assistance and very helpful comments, and to Andrew
Bell, Jim Bushnell, David Card, Raj Chetty, Howard Chong, Lucas Davis, Stephen Holland, Patrick
Kline, Chris Knittel, Bill Marcus, Erich Muehlegger, Karen Notsund, Nancy Ryan, Emmanuel Saez,
Glen Weyl, Frank Wolak, participants in the December 2007 CSEM Policy Conference, the 2008 POWER
Conference, the winter 2010 NBER Industrial Organization program meeting and seminar audiences
at UC Berkeley, MIT, and NYU for very  helpful comments and discussions. this research was supported
in part by a grant from the California Energy Commission to the University of California Energy Institute.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Severin Borenstein. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.The Redistributional Impact of Non-linear Electricity Pricing
Severin Borenstein




Utility regulators frequently focus as much or more on the distributional impact of electric rate structures
as on their efficiency.   The goal of protecting low-income consumers has become more central with
recent increases in wholesale power costs and anticipation of significant costs of greenhouse gas emissions
in the near future.  These concerns have led to the widespread use of increasing-block pricing (IBP),
under which the marginal price to the household increases as its daily or monthly usage rises.   There
is no cost basis for differentiating marginal price of electricity by consumption level, so perhaps nowhere
is the conflict between efficiency and distributional goals greater than in the use of IBP.  California
has adopted some of the most steeply increasing-block tariffs in electric utility history. Combining
household-level utility billing data with census data on income distribution by area, I derive estimates
of the income redistribution effected by these increasing-block electricity tariffs.  I find that the rate
structure does redistribute income to lower-income groups, cutting the bills of households in the lowest
income bracket by about 12% (about $5 per month).  The effect would be about twice as large if not
for the presence of another program that offers a different and lower rate structure to qualified low-income
households.  I find that the deadweight loss associated with IBP is likely to be large relative to the
transfers.  In contrast, I find that the means-tested program transfers income with much less economic
inefficiency.  A much larger share of the revenue redistributed by the IBP tariff, however, comes from
the wealthiest quintile of households, so IBP may be a more progressive structure of redistribution.
 In carrying out the analysis, I also show that a common approach to studying (or controlling for) income
distribution effects by using median household income within a census block group may substantially
understate the potential effects.
Severin Borenstein
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With rising energy costs and growing awareness of the threat of climate change, policy
makers are increasingly coming to the realization that retail energy prices are going to
have to rise in order to reﬂect the full cost of consumption. At the same time, there
is concern that higher energy prices — whether attributable to greenhouse gas policies,
resource scarcity, or market power of sellers — will disproportionately impact the poor.
In the electric utility sector, this tension between income distribution concerns and high
energy prices has been recognized for decades. In the 1970s and 1980s these concerns led
to widespread adoption of increasing-block pricing (IBP) of electricity — also commonly
called inverted-block pricing, increasing-tier pricing, or lifeline rates (though some of these
are means tested). Supporters of IBP argue that these tariﬀs promote conservation by
setting high marginal prices for many consumers while protecting small energy consumers
—w h oa r ep r e s u m e dt ob ep o o r e ro na v e r a g e—b yk e e p i n gt h ep r i c ef o rab a s e l i n el e v e lo f
consumption relatively low.2
California’s regulated utilities adopted increasing-block residential electricity tariﬀs in
the 1980s. Prior to the California electricity crisis in 2000-01, all three of the large regulated
electric utilities in California–Paciﬁc Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison
(SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E)–had two-tiered residential rate structures
where the marginal price in the second tier was 15%-18% higher than in the ﬁrst tier. That
was in line with the structure in many other states. One recent survey of 61 U.S. utilities
(BC Hydro, 2008), found that about one-third of them use IBP for residential customers.
Many more utilities and regulators are currently considering adopting IBP tariﬀs.
After the California electricity crisis, these three investor-owned utilities (IOUs) needed
to raise substantial revenues, but regulators and state legislators were concerned about the
impact on lower-income households. Regulators adopted a ﬁve-tier increasing-block retail
pricing structure where the prices on the ﬁrst two tiers were virtually frozen at pre-crisis
levels and incremental revenue needs were to be collected by raising prices on tiers 3, 4
and 5. The result has been a much more extreme increasing-block tariﬀ structure. By
2008, the price on the highest block–which is the marginal price for about 6%-9% of all
residential customers–ranged from about 80% higher to more than triple the price on the
lowest block, depending on the utility.
2 Declining-block pricing — under which the marginal price of electricity to the customer is lower for units
of consumption beyond a certain baseline level — had been common in the 1960s and 70s. In the following
decades, with increasing focus on conservation, it became seen as promoting wasteful consumption of
power, despite the fact that a two-part tariﬀ almost surely is a closer reﬂection than IBP of the true
cost of serving a residential customer.
2Regardless of one’s views of the externality costs of electricity consumption and the need
for conservation, it is clear that increasing-block electricity pricing distorts the relative
marginal prices that diﬀerent customers face.3 Thus, the use of increasing-block pricing
presents a classic tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and distributional eﬀects in regulated tariﬀ
design. There is, however, very little ﬁrm evidence on the magnitude of this tradeoﬀ, and
none that is based on a large-scale systematic empirical study.
Combining residential bill data with income data at the census block group level, I ﬁrst
develop an approach that yields bounds on the income redistribution eﬀects of these IBP
tariﬀs. This approach and the resulting bounds are related to the literature on ecological
regression.4 Borrowing in part from that literature, I then develop a better estimate
of redistribution based on those bounds. I ﬁnd that low-income customers beneﬁt from
California’s current steeply-tiered rate structure compared to the bills they would have
paid under a ﬂat rate tariﬀ. If this were the only electricity program aimed at helping the
poor, I ﬁnd that IBP would lower the bills of SCE customers in the lowest income bracket
(approximately a quintile) by $9-$11 per month, with somewhat smaller changes for the
other two utilities.
Such analysis of transfers raises the question of the cost in terms of ineﬃcient pricing.
Under a wide range of demand elasticity assumptions, I calculate the deadweight loss that
would result from IBP. For all of the plausible long-run elasticity scenarios, it seems very
likely that the eﬃciency costs of IBP would be substantial compared to the redistributional
impact. An interesting exception arises if the marginal cost of electricity were quite high
(on the order of two to three times higher than wholesale electricity prices during the
sample period), in which case the IBP tariﬀs that I study for California could actually
reduce deadweight loss compared to a break-even ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. California and most
other areas also have a low-income energy assistance program that oﬀers lower rates to
customers who meet some means test. I examined that program as well (called the CARE
program in California), and ﬁnd that it is likely more eﬀective than IBP in redistributing
income relative to the economic distortions it causes.
Separate from the analysis of electricity rates, this approach to analyzing redistribu-
tional eﬀects has implications for a wide variety of studies that use census block group
3 Some have argued that heavy residential users impose higher costs per unit consumption. Such sug-
gestions are based on the correlation between the timing of consumption patterns and overall use, but
the increasing-block tariﬀ takes no account of the timing of use so the connection is quite indirect. See
Marcus (2007).
4 See Goodman (1953), King (1997), Freedman (2004), and Wakeﬁeld (2004).
3level data to look at the eﬀect of business or public policies on income distribution or
vice versa. Many studies use the median household income for a census block group to
represent the income of all households in that area. I show, however, that there is very
large heterogeneity of household incomes within census block groups and that the use of
median household income greatly truncates the income distribution. Thus, studying avail-
able data on income distribution both across and within census block groups could be very
informative, particularly for analyzing impacts on low-income households.
II. Previous Studies of Distributional Impacts of Non-Linear Electricity Pricing
An active literature on IBP in the U.S. existed in the late 1970s and 1980s. A pre-cursor
is Feldstein (1972), who develops a model of the optimal tradeoﬀ between a ﬁxed and
volumetric charge to recover utility costs when the regulator cares about both eﬃciency
and equity. He then applies the model to Massachusetts using estimates of price and income
elasticity of demand from another study. A number of later papers attempt to infer income
transfers from simulations using their own or others’ estimates of the income elasticity of
demand. A few others combine billing data with household surveys of relatively small
populations to infer the impact of IBP. Hennessy (1984) surveys this literature. Faruqui
(2008) presents a recent analysis using the simulation approach, as well as a discussion of
IBP policies among US utilities. Two other papers, Scott (1981) and Hennessy and Keane
(1989), focus on “lifeline” plans that provide discounts for a limited quantity of electricity
that are available on a means-tested basis.5
Inferring redistribution from estimates of income elasticity presents two problems. The
ﬁrst is that those estimates vary widely (with large standard errors) among refereed publi-
cations, implying huge variations in the redistribution eﬀect of IBP. The income elasticities
of residential demand reported in Taylor’s (1975) survey of electricity demand estimation
vary by nearly an order of magnitude, and other studies come to even more divergent
estimates. The second problem is interpretation of the income elasticity estimates. The
standard income elasticity estimate is an attempt to capture the (causal) partial deriva-
tive of electricity consumption with respect to income. To the extent that the regression
controls for other factors, the parameter estimated on income does not capture indirect
income eﬀects that come about from house size, number of people living in the dwelling,
5 Numerous studies outside the U.S. are concerned with the impact of non-linear electricity prices on the
poor. Wodon, Ajwad, and Siaens (2003) and Al-Qudsi and Shatti (1987) present policy analyses of IBP
in Honduras and Kuwait, respectively. Gibson and Price (1986) examine the distributional impact of
two-part tariﬀs in the U.K. natural gas and electricity markets. Hancock and Price (1996) and Price
and Hancock (1998) consider the distributional eﬀects of market liberalization in the UK gas, telecom
and electricity markets, including changes in the ﬁxed and variable-rate components of the tariﬀs.
4propensity to heat with electricity, and other factors. Nor does it capture factors that
may have no causal link with low income, but are highly correlated with income and inﬂu-
ence electricity use. For instance, controlling for weather in a standard electricity demand
regression means that the income parameter does not capture the extent to which poor
people may live in diﬀerent areas with diﬀerent weather than wealthier people. If the goal
is to redistribute income to the poor through IBP, then the cross-sectional co-variation of
income and usage is of interest, not the causal impact of income (directly or indirectly) on
usage. The survey-based studies tend to capture this relationship more eﬀectively than the
regression/simulation studies, but the survey studies are based on much smaller samples
than I am able to use in this case. In addition, while the surveys have individual household
demographics, they suﬀer from lower response rates and greater selection issues than data
from the census. The cost of using the census data is that questions are not as targeted
and the data are not available at the household level for matching to electricity billing
data.
III. Increasing-Block Residential Electricity Rates in California
The analysis in this study has been carried out for all three of the large regulated public
utilities in California — Paciﬁc Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE),
and San Diego Gas & Electric(SDG&E) — with fairly similar results. I focus in the body
of the paper on SCE, but present the results for the other two utilities in the appendix.
The conclusions are consistent across the three utilities.
The standard residential tariﬀs for SCE during 2006 are shown in the top left panel
of Table 1.6 The increasing-block tariﬀ structure implies an increasing marginal price for
electricity. A SCE customer whose consumption level puts him or her on the ﬁfth tier, for
instance, still pays the lower-tier rates for consumption up to 300% of baseline.7
The marginal rate that a residential customer pays increases as consumption increases
relative to a “baseline” consumption level. A household’s baseline allocation is supposed
6 The tariﬀ changed very slightly during 2006. Table 1 presents the time-weighted average tariﬀ. These
are just the volumetric electricity rates. SCE also had a small daily ﬁxed charge, $0.03/day, which I
assume is unchanged under the alternative tariﬀs that I consider. All three utilities also had minimum
daily charges for electricity, but these were set at about the same level as the minimum daily usage cut
oﬀ and that I impose below.
7 For example, under the standard residential rate shown in Table 1, a SCE customer with a baseline
consumption allocation of 300 kWh during a given billing period who actually consumes 1100 kWh
would pay 11.62/ c for each of the ﬁrst 300 kWh, 13.61/ c for each of the next 90 kWh, 22.01/ cf o re a c h
of the next 210 kWh, 30.49/ c for each of the next 300 kWh, and 30.49/ c for each of the last 200 kWh.
During 2006, the regulated prices on the fourth and ﬁfth tier were equal, though that has not always
been the case in earlier or succeeding years.
5% of Standard CARE % of Standard
Baseline Residential Low-income Baseline Residential
Tier Quantity Rate Rate Tier Quantity Rate
                                                                                                                                                             
Actual 2006 tariff (time-weighted average in 2006) Benchmark Five-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1162 $0.0834 1 0-100% $0.1069
2 100%-130% $0.1361 $0.1053 2 100%-130% $0.1268
3 130%-200% $0.2201 $0.1691 3 130%-200% $0.2108
4 200%-300% $0.3049 $0.1717 4 200%-300% $0.2956
5 300%+ $0.3049 $0.1717 5 300%+ $0.2956
                                      _______________________________________ ________________________
                                                                                                                                                             
Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with CARE program Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with no CARE program
0%+ $0.1731 $0.1060 0%+ $0.1592
Table 1: 2006 Southern California Edison Retail Electricity Rates
to correspond to a minimal basic electricity usage. The baseline, however, is the same for
all residential customers in a region regardless of the size of the residence or the number
of people who live there. Within the region, a studio apartment receives the same baseline
allocation as a four-bedroom house.8 Baseline allocations do diﬀer by geographic regions
within the utility area: SCE’s service territory is divided into 6 diﬀerent baseline regions.
This is argued to reﬂect variation in basic electricity need due to climate diﬀerences,
but in practice baselines are set based on diﬀerent average usage across regions. As a
result, variation is driven not only by climate diﬀerences, but also by wealth levels, average
residence size, and choices to install air-conditioning.
Prior to the California electricity crisis in 2000-01, SCE had a two-tier rate structure
with prices near those on the ﬁrst two tiers of the structure shown in top panel of Table
1. All consumption above the baseline level was charged at the second-tier rate. After the
extreme ﬁnancial losses associated with the electricity crisis, the structure was changed
to ﬁve tiers and rates were raised substantially for the third, fourth and ﬁfth tiers. As a
result, in 2006 the marginal price on the fourth and ﬁfth tier was nearly three times higher
than on the ﬁrst tier. The same qualitative changes occurred at the other two regulated
utilities in California, but the resulting rates are noticably diﬀerent — more steeply tiered
at PG&E, less so at SDG&E — owing in part to the diﬀerences in economic losses they
incurred during the California electricity crisis.
Not all residential customers of the IOUs are on the standard tariﬀ. The largest exception
from the standard tariﬀ is customers who are on the CARE (California Alternate Rates for
Energy) program, which is an income-based program that oﬀers lower rates to low-income
customers.9 At SCE, 25.2% of residential customers were on the CARE program in 2006.
8 The baseline allocation is higher for approximately 10% of customers who have electric heating systems
and some other electrical appliances.
9 For 2006, a residence with one or two occupants had to have a household income no higher than $28,600
6The CARE program is advertised as oﬀering “a 20% discount” oﬀ the standard residential
rates, but not all components of the bill are included in the discount, some components
are not charged to CARE customers, and the exact implementation is quite complex. In
practice, the discount is at least 20% and was up to 44% on marginal consumption at
higher tiers during 2006, as shown in Table 1. Overall, because of the discount on each
tier and the fact that CARE customers consumed a higher proportion of their power on
lower tiers, the average price paid per kilowatt-hour was 39% lower for CARE customers
than for customers on the standard residential rate.
A small number of customers are on special tariﬀs that incorporate time-of-use electricity
pricing, interruptible air-conditioning use, mobilehome/RV/marina accounts, or other id-
iosyncratic rate structures. In aggregate, these nonstandard tariﬀs covered 1.4% of SCE’s
residential customers in 2006, who consumed 2.1% of residential power. Most of these
customers still face a ﬁve-tier tariﬀ, but with diﬀerent baseline allocations and in some
cases somewhat diﬀerent rates on the tiers.
Regardless of the tariﬀ that a customer is on, the customer has a baseline allocation and
his or her monthly consumption can be allocated across the ﬁve tiers of the tariﬀ. The top
panel of Table 2 shows the total quantity of residential consumption that was billed on
each of the tiers during 2006. The lower-income customers who are on the CARE program
consume less on average than other residential customers, but there is substantial overlap
in the distributions with many low-consuming customers who are not on CARE, and some
CARE customers with consumption levels even out to the ﬁfth tier. The bottom panel of
Table 2 shows the proportion of households whose average daily consumption puts them
on each of the ﬁve tiers in the rate structure.10 Among SCE’s non-CARE customers, for
instance, 32.4% consume less than the baseline and therefore face the tier 1 price for their
marginal consumption, while 11.3% consume more than 300% of baseline so face the tier
5 price for their marginal consumption.
With billing data alone, comparison of CARE to non-CARE customers is about all one
can do to analyze the consumption patterns of richer versus poorer customers. This is,
however, not the most useful comparison for analysis of the ﬁve-tier tariﬀ system. At least
four questions arise in examining the distributional impact of increasing-block pricing in
electricity pricing: (1) how eﬀectively does IBP redistribute income to poorer households
in order to qualify for CARE, with the threshold increasing by $5,000 for a third occupant, and by
$6,900 for each additional occupant.
10 To be precise, the bottom panel of Table 2 shows the customer-days weighted-average proportion of
bills during 2006 for which marginal consumption was billed at each tier.
7Residential
Usage Percentage of Residential Usage CARE/Non-CARE Shares
(million-kWh) t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5 %  U s a g e %  c u s t o m e r s
Non-CARE 23,046 52.9% 10.7% 16.5% 10.9% 9.0% 79.3% 74.8%
CARE 6,016 66.0% 10.7% 13.5% 6.7% 3.1% 20.7% 25.2%
                                        ______________________________________
                                                                                                                                                             
Percentage of Customers on Each Tier for Marginal Consumption
t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5
Non-CARE 32.4% 14.2% 25.0% 17.2% 11.3%
CARE 45.4% 16.7% 22.7% 10.9% 4.3%
                                                                                                                                                             
NOTE: reported results drop household accounts with consumption of less than 1 kWh/day
Table 2: Distribution of SCE Residential Customer Consumption Across Tariﬀ Tiers
(in the absence of any means-tested program, such as CARE)?; (2) what is the eﬃciency
eﬀect of such an IBP? (3) what impact does the CARE program have?; and (4) given the
existence of the CARE program what is the incremental eﬀect of IBP? I attempt to answer
these questions by merging utility billing data with census data on income levels by census
block group.
IV. Data Sources
The data for this analysis come from utility residential billing records and the U.S.
census. Utility residential billing records were made available to the U.C. Energy Institute
by all three of the large California investor-owned electric utilities on a conﬁdential basis.
The data used in this analysis include virtually all residential bills for 2006. Customers
who were not individually metered, but instead are part of a “master-metered” building
or other location, were not included in the data. In aggregate, such accounts constitute
less than 3% of residential consumption at each of the utilities.
The data do not include the address or the name of the customer. They do, however,
include the nine-digit ZIP code, which allows a fairly precise neighborhood matching with
census data. The utility data also include usage on each of the ﬁve tiers, days in the
billing period, tariﬀ (including whether or not the customer is on the CARE program),
total amount billed, and assigned baseline quantity.
Actual billing periods do not begin and end exactly at the beginning and end of the
calendar year, so annual bills were created by interpolating usage and charges for bills that
overlapped the beginning and end of the year.11 I also dropped bills with consumption of
11 For instance, a bill that included 13 days at the end of 2005 and 18 days at the beginning of 2006 was
8less than 1 kWh/day. A refrigerator typically uses 1-2 kWh/day,12 so it is implausible that
an occupied primary residence would fall below 1 kWh/day. Dropping these observations
should permit a closer match to the census data. Including these observations does not
change the qualitative results, but it increases the number of customer-days by about 1.4%.
Summary household income data are available from the U.S. Census at the level of
census block group (CBG), a geographic designation that on average includes about 600
households in California. Census block groups are considerably larger than the areas
associated with nine-digit ZIP codes. Each nine-digit ZIP code is assigned to the CBG
i nw h i c hi tw a sl o c a t e d . 13 The analysis presented here was then carried out at the CBG
level. Results presented here use 2000 census data updated to 2007 by Geolytics, but the
results are very similar if the analysis is based on the original 2000 data.14
Census Measures of Household Income
Household income data at the CBG level includes median household income and mean
per capita income.15 In economics, epidemiology, and other areas of research, these sum-
mary measures are frequently used by associating them with every household in the CBG.16
Unfortunately for such applications, there is considerable income heterogeneity within
CBGs. This is evident from additional data released by the Census that break down
households into very small income brackets for each CBG in the 2000 census. Because
incorporated into the annual bill by adding 18/31 of the usage and 18/31 of the billed amount to the
annual bill. Data for PG&E, unfortunately, did not extend beyond the end of 2006, so billing periods
that ended after December 31, 2006 would be lost if I were to apply this procedure to PG&E. To greatly
reduce this problem, the period of analysis for PG&E was shifted by one month and I instead studied
December 2005-November 2006.
12 See http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=refrig.display products html .
13 A small number of customer records did not include a nine-digit ZIP code, or did not match to a nine-
digit ZIP code in the census data. In the case of nine-digit ZIP codes that did not match to the census
data, I used the numerically closest nine-digit ZIP code. In the case of having only a ﬁve-digit ZIP
code, those customers were allocated probabilistically among all of the nine-digit ZIP codes within the
ﬁve-digit ZIP code based on the share of households that were in each of the nine-digit ZIP codes.
14 For details of the updating see, http://www.geolytics.com.
15 Household income data from the U.S. Census are based on the “long form” questionnaire that is dis-
tributed to about 1/6 of all households.
16 Examples in economics include hedonic real estate demand models, Bajari & Kahn (2008), auto demand,
Busse, Silva-Risso and Zettelemeyer (2006), education valuation, Jacob & Lefgren (2007) and Hastings,
Kane & Staiger (2005), local pollution impacts on housing, Gayer, Hamilton & Viscusi (2000), and
eﬀects of low income housing tax credits, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009). Of course, the importance of
this simpliﬁcation will diﬀer depending on the empirical application.
9Figure 1: Distribution of Household Income and Median Household Income
(weighted by households) By Census Block Group
many brackets have zero households in many CBGs and because this is a 17% sample, not
a census, I aggregate the data to 5 income brackets that are approximate quintile breaks:
$0-$20,000, $20,000-$40,000, $40,000-$60,000, $60,000-$100,000, and over $100,000. In the
17768 census block groups I consider in California – those served by the three investor-
owned utilities – the breakpoints between these categories correspond to the 18th, 41st,
59th and 82nd percentiles in the distribution of household income.
It would be very convenient for this analysis if all of the population in a given CBG fell
into one of these income brackets, but that is far from the case. Looking at the shares of
households in each bracket, one can calculate a Herﬁndahl index to measure concentration
of households within the income brackets for a given CBG. This index is the sum of the
squared shares of population in each bracket. With ﬁve income groups, it has a minimum
of 0.2 (if households within a CBG were evenly divided across the ﬁve brackets) and a
maximum of 1 (if households were all in the same bracket). Calculating this index for
the census block groups I examine in California, the average value is 0.29, indicating more
dispersion than if the population within each CBG were evenly divided across any three
income brackets (which would yield a value of 0.333).
10Because of this within-CBG dispersion, assigning to every household within a CBG the
median household income or mean per capita income for that CBG substantially under-
states the variance in the distribution at the household level. More extreme high and
low income levels are underrepresented. Figure 1 illustrates this eﬀect by showing the
households-weighted distribution of median household incomes within CBGs and the as-
signment of individual households to each of the ﬁve income brackets. About 18% of
households report income below $20,000, but only about 2.5% of households live in CBGs
with a median income below $20,000.
Thus, it will be important for this analysis to account for income heterogeneity within
the CBGs. I do that in a variety of ways, as explained in section VI.
V. Creating Benchmark and Counterfactual Bills
I begin the analysis by constructing the bills that each customer would face under
alternative tariﬀ structures. Essentially, this amounts to calculating the alternative tariﬀ
structures under the constraint that they all generate the same total revenue. Implicit in
this exercise is the assumption that demand is completely inelastic, so that a customer
will consume the same quantities regardless of which tariﬀ they face. Obviously, this
is not realistic if customers exhibit some elasticity with respect to the marginal price
variation after controlling for the system average price. I return to this issue in section
VIII, reestimating the impact for a range of elasticities and explaining why the eﬀect of
this change is quite small.
I focus ﬁrst on a simple case in which there is no means-tested (e.g., CARE) program.
A hypothetical ﬁve-tier tariﬀ structure is created by subtracting a constant from each
tier of the non-CARE tariﬀ resulting in a tariﬀ structure that generates the same total
revenue as under the actual tariﬀs under the current participation in the CARE program.17
The resulting tariﬀ “Benchmark Five-Tier Tariﬀ with No CARE Program” is shown at
the top of the right-hand panel of Table 1. From this alternative ﬁve-tier tariﬀ, it is
straightforward to generate a ﬂat electricity rate for comparison.18 Focusing on this case,
17 I construct the benchmark ﬁve-tier tariﬀ by subtracting a constant from the actual tariﬀ, because the
CARE program is funded in part from non-CARE residential energy by a ﬂat per-kWh charge. Over
half of the CARE funding comes from commercial/industrial/agricultural customers. For the purpose
of this study, I hold that transfer between customer classes constant and assume that all rate changes
must be revenue-neutral among residential customers.
18 I also create a two-tiered tariﬀ with an 18% step between the tiers, which more closely reﬂects the
IBPs in use in many other states as well as the structure that existed in California prior to the 2000-01
electricity crisis. Results for this tariﬀ are presented in the appendix.
11without the complexity of an overlapping means-tested program, allows a clear analysis of
the impact of a steeply increasing tiered rate structure alone. In section IX, I reintroduce
the means-tested program.
With these tariﬀs, the quantities consumed by each customer, and the assumption of no
demand elasticity, it is straightforward to generate the total amount each customer would
be billed under each of these tariﬀs. The more challenging aspect of the analysis is to
match customers with income brackets, as is discussed in the next section.
VI. Matching Households to Income Brackets
As explained earlier, with very high accuracy each customer can be matched to a census
block group and the census data include the distribution of household income across income
brackets. The income brackets are helpful in capturing the tails of the distribution, but they
are especially useful if one can use other information to allocate households within a CBG
across the income brackets. Household electricity usage is potentially such complementary
information. Though estimates of the income elasticity of demand for electricity vary
widely, they are nearly all positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.19
The same positive relationship seems likely to hold within census block groups. Unfor-
tunately, I could ﬁnd no direct studies of the level of that correlation within a CBG or,
more speciﬁcally for this analysis, how closely the ranking of households by usage would
correspond to the ranking by income. Nor do the data for this study allow such inference.
There are, however, two cases that can be easily studied and imply bounds (of a sort I
describe below) on the degree of redistribution associated with the diﬀerent tariﬀs. Variants
of this approach may be usable in accounting for within-CBG income dispersion in studying
the impact of many policy changes on people of diﬀerent income.
First, one can assume that within a CBG, usage is completely uncorrelated with house-
hold income. It is possible that income and electricity usage could be negatively correlated
within CBGs, but a negative correlation is not supported by any empirical studies of larger
populations. Under the assumption of zero correlation, households could be randomly al-
located across income brackets within the CBG in proportion to the census data share of
households within each income bracket. It may at ﬁrst appear that this is nearly equivalent
to assigning median household income to all households, but this approach still allocates
19 Every study I have found estimates a positive long-run income elasticity of demand for electricity,
though the estimates range at least from 0.2 to 1.6. See Taylor (1975), Herriges & King (1994), and
Kamerschen & Porter (2004).
12many more households to very low-income and high-income categories than does the me-
dian household income. Thus, if the goal is to examine the change in electricity costs with
particular focus on low-income households, this approach would still be more informative.
Since there is very likely some positive correlation between income and electricity usage,
this “random-rank method” is likely to incorrectly associate too many poor households
with high usage and too many wealthy households with low usage within each CBG.
At the opposite extreme, one can assume that usage is perfectly rank correlated with
household income within a CBG. Households can then be ranked by usage and allocated
across income brackets in proportion to the census data shares such that every member
of a lower income bracket has lower household electricity usage than any member of a
higher income bracket. In reality, the rank correlation is certainly not perfect, so this
“usage rank method” will incorrectly associate too many poor households with low usage
and too many wealthy households with high usage within each CBG. Note again that this
allocation is only occurring within each CBG, so either approach will still capture the
income redistribution across CBGs that results from diﬀerent average income and usage
levels.
This bounding approach is closely related to the techniques of ecological or aggregate
regression.20 In an ecological regression there are only categorical share data for the two
variables, usually by spatial areas of aggregation — such as a CBG or county.21 In this
analysis, I have individual level data on the “predictor” variable, electricity consump-
tion, though there is still no ability to directly match the individual consumption data
to invidivual data on the “response variable,” which is income.22 Instead, I have only
aggregate share data on the response variable, which is shares of the population that fall
into each income bracket. The random-rank method described above corresponds closely
to the “neighborhood model” regression approach described by Freedman (2004). The
underlying assumption is that within-neighborhood variation is not helpful in identifying
the relationship, i.e., that within-neighborhood variation in the electricity consumption is
orthogonal to income. My approach diﬀers somewhat, because the eﬀect of interest in this
20 Freedman (2004) gives a concise overview of ecological regression.
21 A representative topic in ecological regression would be to infer the share of blacks who are registered
Republicans from data by voting precinct on the share of adults registered Republican and the share of
adults who are black. In broad terms, the ecological regression literature is an investigation of what can
be learned from a regression of share-Republican on share-black and how such a regression can produce
biased estimates of the propensity of blacks to register Republican.
22 The “predictor” and “response” terminology comes from Wakeﬁeld (2004). He is careful to point out
that the relationship need not be causal.
13case — the change in electricity bill — is a mechanical function of the variable for which
individual data are available — electricity usage — so a regression to estimate an average
relationship is not necessary. Instead, both the random-rank method and the usage-rank
method are numerical calculations.
Both the random-rank and the usage rank methods are related to the “method of
bounds” suggested by Duncan and Davis (1953). In the standard 2-groups/2-states model
in ecological regression, the minimum and maximum possible propensity of one group to
be in either state can be calculated from the aggregate shares of the groups and the states.
For instance, if the share of registered Republicans in a precinct is 30% and the share of
registered black voters is 80%, then the share of black voters who are registered Republi-
cans must lie between 12.5% (10
80, if all non-black voters are Republican) and 37.5% (30
80,i f
all non-black voters are not Republican).
Similarly, given the aggregate income distribution in a CBG, one could construct the
minimum and maximum consumption of the customers in any one income bracket by
assigning the highest-usage or lowest-usage bills within the CBG to that income bracket.
In practice, given that the income elasticity of demand is widely believed to be positive
throughout the income distribution, it seems the most plausible bound is one in which
customers are assigned monotonically by usage to the income brackets. The opposite
bound would be a monotonic inverse assignment by usage, but that bound is obviously
much less helpful than the random-rank approach if we are fairly certain that electricity
usage is non-decreasing with income. So, the random-rank and usage rank approaches are
a practical adaptation of the method of bounds to this dataset and policy question.
The inference from this bounding method is limited, however, by two factors. First, in
a 5-group application such as the present case, the switch from random ranking to usage
ranking only has clear implications for the lowest and highest groups. The random-rank
method understates the degree of usage diﬀerentition across income groups within the
CBG, so it would understate average usage of the highest-income group and overstate
average usage of the lowest-income group.23 The usage rank method overstates average
usage of the highest-income group and understates average usage of the lowest-income
group. For the three “interior” income brackets, however, the change from applying these
approaches will depend on the particular distributions of usage and income.
S e c o n d ,t h eg o a lo ft h i si n v e s t i g a t i o ni st oa n a l y z eb i l lchanges due to the tariﬀ change
(not usage or bill levels). Only if the impact of the policy change (in this case, the change
23 This is the case assuming that the true within-CBG correlation between income and usage is positive.
14Figure 2: Monetary and Percentage Change in SCE Bill Due to Switch from Flat-Rate
to 5-Tier Tariﬀ as a Function of Consumption/Baseline Ratio
in tariﬀ structure) is monotonic in the observed predictor variable (in this case, household
electricity consumption) would these two approaches produce upper and lower bounds on
the redistributional impact of the policy, at least for the lowest and highest income brackets
where the approaches do place bounds on the usage of members of these groups. In this
case, if the change to an IBP tariﬀ had a monotonically increasing eﬀect on bills as usage
increased, then the “random-rank method” would provide a lower bound on the policy’s
impact (on the top and bottom income brackets) and the “usage rank method” would
provide an upper bound.
That is in fact the case in studying the proportional change in bills. As shown in ﬁgure 2
for SCE, the percentage bill change is constant out to 100% of baseline, and then increases
monotonically beyond 100% of baseline. As a result, the “random-rank method” will
provide a lower bound on the percentage decrease that lowest income households will face
and the percentage increase that the highest income households will face. The “usage rank
method” will provide upper bounds on each.
The analysis of the monetary (i.e., measured in dollars, not proportional) bill change by
income bracket is less straightforward because the monetary bill change is not monotonic
15in usage, as is also shown in ﬁgure 2 for SCE. The change is necessarily zero for a zero-
consumption customer and decreases linearly over the 0-100% of baseline range, for which
the per-kWh price change is constant. In fact, the bill change grows more negative out to
a consumption level equal to 130% of baseline — nearly coincident with the median usage
level — and rises after that. As a result, the change from random ranking to usage ranking
does not necessarily increase the assumed within-CBG correlation between income and
size of the bill change a customer would face from the new policy.
Nonetheless, I proceed with these two approaches because they provide benchmarks for
at least the lowest and highest income brackets and, more importantly, because they are
the basis for a reﬁnement I develop in the next section that attempts to improve on the
bounding approach.
Before applying the random and usage ranking approaches, I make one further adjust-
ment due to an additional piece of information that is available in this empirical applica-
tion: the billing data indicate whether or not each household is participating in the CARE
program, which indicates a much higher probability of being poor. This adjustment is
described in detail in the appendix. Essentially, for each CBG I allocate slots within each
of the ﬁve income brakcets to CARE and non-CARE customers based on earlier studies
of the rate of CARE penetration among eligible customers. Within each CBG, I then al-
locate “CARE slots” among CARE customers and “non-CARE slots” among non-CARE
customers based on the random or usage ranking methods. This adjustment for CARE par-
ticipation does not have a large impact in the random-rank and usage-rank boundary cases,
but it does tend to reduce slightly the diﬀerences between the two ranking approaches.
It will be more relevant in the subsequent analysis where I compare the redistributional
impacts of IBP and a means-tested program like CARE.24
Results
Under each of the within-CBG ranking methods, Table 3 presents the average annual
electricity bills in each of the income brackets under the benchmark ﬁve-tier tariﬀ and the
alternative revenue-neutral ﬂat tariﬀ, each applied to all residential customers. Unfortu-
nately, these bounds do not narrow the range of the redistributional impact as much as
one would like.25 Changing from a ﬂat rate tariﬀ to the benchmark 5-tier tariﬀ lowers
24 At this point, I am using the CARE participation information only to identify households that are more
likely to be low income. For now, all customers are still assumed to be subject to the same tariﬀ for the
purpose of the redistribution calculations.
25 This is consistent with the diﬃculty that Freedman (2004) reports with the method of bounds in
16Average          Average Annualized Bill
Income Share of Daily Use Dollar Percent
Range Customers (kWh) Flat 5-tier Change Change
random $0-$20k 17.9% 16.98 $986 $908 -$78 -8.0%
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 17.93 $1,041 $985 -$57 -5.5%
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.34 $1,124 $1,104 -$19 -1.7%
$60k-$100k 23.7% 20.86 $1,212 $1,237 $25 2.0%
>$100k 17.4% 23.85 $1,386 $1,527 $141 10.2%
                                                                                                                             
usage $0-$20k 17.9% 8.85 $514 $365 -$149 -28.9%
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 14.56 $846 $696 -$150 -17.7%
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 16.61 $965 $834 -$131 -13.6%
$60k-$100k 23.7% 21.90 $1,272 $1,201 -$72 -5.6%
>$100k 17.4% 38.08 $2,212 $2,797 $585 26.4%
                                                                                                                             
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers, all on no-CARE-program rates from table 1 
Table 3: SCE Average Bill By Income Bracket Under Benchmark 5-Tier and Flat-Rate
Tariﬀs Using Random-Rank and Usage-Rank Methods for Within-CBG Allocation
the annual bills of households in the lowest income bracket by between 8% and 29% on
average.26 The $78 to $149 range of monetary bill decline are not strict bounds due to the
non-monotonic relationship between consumption level and monetary bill change, but they
reinforce the point that the bounds oﬀer less guidance than one would hope for. The tables
in the appendix also includes results for a two-tier tariﬀ approach with an 18% diﬀerential
between the baseline price and the second-tier price. This is similar to the tariﬀs that the
California utilities oﬀered prior to the 2000-01 electricity crisis, and much closer to the
sort of IBP schedules that are being utilized, or are being considered, in a number of other
states. The results for such a two-tier tariﬀ fall between the ﬂat-rate and ﬁve-tier tariﬀ
results, but are much closer to the ﬂat-rate results.
VII. Reﬁning the Redistribution Estimates
Besides suggesting very diﬀerent redistributional impacts, the two approaches to allocat-
ing customers to income brackets within census block groups imply substantial diﬀerences
in other attributes, including average consumption quantities and average monthly bill.
Under the usage-rank method, households in the highest bracket are estimated to con-
sume on average over four times as much electricity and pay over seven times higher bills
(under IBP) as those in the lowest bracket. The random-rank method, however, implies
very diﬀerent distributions across the income brackets: households in the highest bracket
consume on average only 41% more electricity and pay only 68% higher bills than those in
ecological regression.
26 Even these bounds assume that the correlation is positive.
17the lowest bracket. These implied average diﬀerences in ancillary attributes can be used
to calibrate the within-CBG allocation of households to income brackets and potentially
obtain a better estimate of income redistribution than either approach aﬀords in isola-
tion. Conceptually, if one knew the actual average consumption or average bill by income
bracket, one could use some weighting of the random ranking and usage ranking to develop
redistribution estimates that matched the actual distribution of these attributes as closely
as possible.
I return momentarily to the question of how to estimate averages of these ancillary
attributes by income bracket. For now, assume that one knew the average of ancillary
attribute φ for each income bracket, ¯ φb, within the population of households the utility
serves and that the random-rank and usage-rank methods each produced an implied ˜ φb for
each imcome bracket. I develop a weighting of the random-rank and usage-rank methods
in order to ﬁnd the weight that minimizes a metric of the diﬀerence between the resulting
˜ φ vector and the ¯ φ vector.
To be concrete, with N households in a CBG, they are assigned integer rankings from 1 to
N, which are then used to assign them to the income bracket slots as was described earlier.
In the case of random ranking, these integer ranks are assigned based on random number
generation, while in the case of usage ranking, they are assigned in order of average daily
usage. For any weighting factor w,w h e r e0 < w < 1, each household is assigned a weighted
ranking value, vh =( 1−w)·rrh+w·ruh, where rrh and ruh are the integer rankings from
the random-rank and usage-rank methods, respectively. They are then assigned to the
income bracket slots based on the ranking of their vh values. Every w yields a vector of
˜ φb(w) attributes across income brackets. Table 3 shows the two attributes, average daily
usage and average monthly bill, for w = 0 (random rank) and w = 1 (usage rank). It is
straightforward to calculate these average attribute values for any w, which I do for every
−1 <w<1 at increments of 0.01.




sb · [˜ φb(w) − ¯ φb]2
where sb is the share of the population in income bracket b.T h ev a l u eo fw that minimizes G
is then w∗, the weighting of the random-rank and usage-rank methods that best calibrates
the ancillary attribute.
Unfortunately, no data are available for which I can generate exact calculations of either
average usage or average bill by income bracket. However, two diﬀerent approaches are
18feasible using diﬀerent samples from the census. I describe each approach brieﬂy here and
in more detail in the appendix. The estimates from these approaches then are used as the
¯ φb for determining w∗, while accounting for the fact that they are statistical estimates.
Method A: Calibration using CBG-level income data and ecological regression
The billing data can be used to generate average household consumption by CBG and
the long-form census data discussed earlier report the distribution of households across
incomes brackets by CBG. Thus, average household consumption by income bracket can be
estimated as an ecological regression problem, with the accompanying bias issues associated
with this method.
In this formulation, a customer h whose income falls in bracket b consumes qhb =¯ qb+ h
where ¯ qb is the mean of consumption of customers in bracket b,a n d  is orthogonal to
customer income bracket over the entire population, by deﬁnition, because

h  h =0
within each income bracket. Therefore, in a CBG, g,w i t hH households the average









where sbg are the shares of customers in each income bracket within that CBG. One could




αbsbg + η. [2]
The αb are then the least-squares estimates of income bracket mean consumption levels
that generate the set of mean household consumption levels across the CBGs. The goal
here is not to estimate the full causal model for ¯ qg, but rather to extract the best estimate
of the mean consumption within each income bracket. Therefore, we are not, for instance,
interested in the fact that wealthy people on average tend to own more air conditioning
units, live in larger houses, or live in detached dwellings, and that it is these factors that
directly raise household electricity demand.
The ecological regression literature points out two likely causes of bias from this sort
of regression of aggregates. The ﬁrst is common omitted variable bias. This will occur
if diﬀerentiation in average consumption across CBGs is aﬀected by another CBG-level
factor that is correlated with the sb. For instance, if wealthy people tend to live in milder
climates, then it may appear that CBGs with more wealthy people consume less power,
19leading to downward biased estimates of consumption ¯ qb for higher income brackets and
upward biased estimates for lower income brackets. I control for climate by including
heating and cooling degree days for the local area interacted with population shares in
each income bracket so that, for instance, hot weather is allowed to aﬀect the consumption
of wealthy households diﬀerently than poor households.
The second source of possible bias, known as contextual bias, occurs if the relationship
between the predictor variable and the response variable is itself dependent on the shares
of the population that fall into each category of the predictor.27 In the current analysis,
the bias would occur, for instance, if among all lowest-bracket income households, those
living in a predominantly wealthy CBG consumed more electricity on average than those
living in a predominantly poor CBG. If people of all income brackets tended towards
consumption levels similar to others in their CBG, then failing to capture this contextual
eﬀect, would lead to an overestimate of the average consumption of high-income households
and underestimate the consumption of low-income households.28
In the standard 2-groups/2-states ecological model, contextual bias is very diﬃcult to
overcome, because the “context” — the breakdown of the area’s population across groups —
is perfectly correlated with the share of either group. For example, if all voters are grouped
into black or white, then every voting precinct with 30% black voters is a precinct with 30%
black and 70% white voters. With ﬁve groups, as is the case in this analysis, the hope for
identifying the ecological parameter improves because there is no such perfect correlation.
For instance, in one CBG the lowest income bracket could be 15% of the population with
the rest spread evenly across the other four brackers, while in another CBG the lowest
bracket could again be 15%, but the entire rest of the population could be in the second
lowest income bracket. The predictor variable for the lowest bracket would be the same,
but the context would be diﬀerent, thus allowing separate identiﬁcation of the two eﬀects,
subject to the usual caveat about functional form assumptions.
I implement this strategy by extending [2] to include not just the share of customers in
each income bracket, but interaction of these shares with the median household income
in the CBG. The regression, reported in the appendix, yields estimates of average daily
27 The absence of such a relationship is known as the “constancy assumption.” See Freedman, 2004.
28 For instance, consider two equal-sized CBGs, one 80% poor/20% rich with average daily consumption
of 10 and one 40% poor/60% rich with average daily consumption of 20. If rich/poor have independent
consumption — no contextual eﬀect — these data would imply that the average daily consumption of rich
households is 30 and average daily consumption of poor households is 5. If, in fact, consumption is 100%
contextual — all households in a CBG have the same expected consumption regardless of wealth — this
implies that rich households have an average daily consumption of 17.5 and poor households 13.3333.
20electricity consumption for households in each of the ﬁve income brackets, the ¯ φb,w h i c h
are a function of both the direct income share parameters and the parameters on the
median household income and weather interaction eﬀects. The goodness-of-ﬁt measure
G is calculated for every possible w and the w that minimizes G is w∗. For SCE, this
procedure yields an estimated w∗ =0 .27.
The estimate of interest, however, is not w∗ itself, but average bill changes by income
bracket, which are a highly nonlinear and possibly even non-monotonic function of w∗.
Thus, bill changes implied by the point estimate of w∗ might not be reliable estimates, and
would almost certainly be improved upon by taking into account the entire distribution of
the w∗ estimate. Since w∗ is the result of minimizing a function of estimated parameters, it
is possible to generate a distribution of the estimated w∗ with standard bootstrap methods.
From 1000 bootstrap estimates of the ecological regression, the resulting distribution of
w∗ implies a 95% conﬁdence interval of [0.06,0.44] — so both the random-rank results and
the usage-rank results are rejected — a mean estimate of w∗ =0 .27, and a median estimate
of w∗ =0 .28.
Each w value is uniquely associated with a ranking of customers for allocation across
the income brackets and therefore generates a unique set of changes to the average bills of
customers in each bracket. So, a distribution of the w∗ estimates implies a distribution of
the estimated bill changes. In Table 4, I report the mean and 95% conﬁdence interval of
those distributions. For the lowest income bracket, this approach results in an expected
monetary bill change of −$ 1 2 9p e ry e a r ,ad r o po fs l i g h t l yl e s st h a n$ 1 1p e rm o n t h .T h e
distribution is skewed, however, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of [−$142,−$92]. Most of
t h ew e i g h to ft h ew∗ distribution is associated with bill declines that are slightly larger than
the point estimate, but both tails of the w∗ distribution have smaller (in absolute value)
changes and one tail (towards random rank) has much smaller changes. The distribution
of percentage bill changes does not exhibit nearly as much skewness, with a mean of
−16.5% and a 95% conﬁdence interval of [−21.3%,−9.7%]. For both the monetary and
percentage bill changes for the lowest income bracket, the random-rank and usage-rank
results lie outside the 95% conﬁdence intervals. This is also true for the second lowest
and the highest income bracket. As shown in the appendix, the estimated bill changes
are somewhat smaller for PG&E and substantially smaller for SDG&E. SDG&E’s smaller
impact is probably explained in part by the fact that it has a less-steep IBP tariﬀ, but
PG&E’s tariﬀ is steeper than SCE’s yet appears to redistribute income less eﬀectively.
The results for all three utilities conﬁrm that moving from a ﬂat rate tariﬀ to IBP on
average generates statistically signiﬁcant transfers from the two wealthiest income brackets,
21Average             Average Annualized Bill Aggregate
Income Share of Daily Use Dollar Percent Annual
Range Customers (kWh) Flat 5-tier Chg 95% conf intvl Change 95% conf intvl Chg ($M)
random $0-$20k 17.9% 16.98 $986 $908 -$78 -8.0% -$57
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 17.93 $1,041 $985 -$57 -5.5% -$51
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.34 $1,124 $1,104 -$19 -1.7% -$15
$60k-$100k 23.7% 20.86 $1,212 $1,237 $25 2.0% $24
>$100k 17.4% 23.85 $1,386 $1,527 $141 10.2% $99
                                                                                                                                                                                      
weighted $0-$20k 17.9% 13.66 $794 $665 -$129 [-$146, -$92] -16.5% [-21.3%, -9.7%] -$93
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 16.80 $976 $884 -$92 [-$119,-$58] -9.5% [-12.9%, -5.6%] -$82
method A $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.31 $1,122 $1,090 -$32 [-$66, -$18] -2.9% [-6.1%, -1.6%] -$24
$60k-$100k 23.7% 21.27 $1,236 $1,261 $25 [$19. $26] 2.0% [1.5%, 2.2%] $24
>$100k 17.4% 28.19 $1,638 $1,889 $251 [$155, $347] 15.2% [10.9%, 19.0%] $177
weighted $0-$20k 17.9% 15.20 $883 $772 -$111 [-$116, -$106] -12.6% [-13.3%, -11.8%] -$80
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 17.57 $1,021 $953 -$68 [-$71, -$64] -6.6% [-7.0%, -6.2%] -$61
method B $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.55 $1,136 $1,117 -$19 [-$19, -$18] -1.6% [-1.7%, -1.6%] -$14
$60k-$100k 23.7% 20.97 $1,218 $1,244 $26 [$26, $26] 2.2% [2.1%, 2.2%] $25
>$100k 17.4% 25.76 $1,496 $1,682 $186 [$176, $195] 12.4% [11.9%, 12.8%] $131
                                                                                                                                                                                      
usage $0-$20k 17.9% 8.85 $514 $365 -$149 -28.9% -$108
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 14.56 $846 $696 -$150 -17.7% -$134
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 16.61 $965 $834 -$131 -13.6% -$100
$60k-$100k 23.7% 21.90 $1,272 $1,201 -$72 -5.6% -$69
>$100k 17.4% 38.08 $2,212 $2,797 $585 26.4% $412
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers, all on no-CARE-program rates from table 1 
Table 4: SCE Average Bill By Income Bracket Under Benchmark and Alternative Flat-Rate
Tariﬀ Using Random-Rank, Usage-Rank and Weighted-Rank Within-CBG Allocation Methods
mostly from the wealthiest bracket, to the three poorer income brackets, mostly to the two
lowest. Among the slightly more than 4 million full-year-equivalent SCE customers in the
dataset,29 those monetary redistribution estimates represent aggregate annual transfers
shown in the right-hand column of Table 4.
Method B: Calibration using average bill by income bracket
An alternative calibration approach uses a diﬀerent dataset from the census, the Amer-
ican Community Survey, which is an approximately 1% household survey that asks more
detailed consumption questions, including both the household’s income and its monthly
expenditures on electricity. Location data for these households are much less precise, so
they cannot be grouped by CBG or matched with certainty to SCE’s service territory in
29 This is the total number of customer-days in the dataset divided by 365.
22some cases. As described in the appendix, I weight household observations by the proba-
bility that they lie in SCE’s service territory based on zip code coverage data. I then use
these data to estimate average household monthly bill by income bracket and calculate
the goodness-of-ﬁt measure against the average household monthly bills by income bracket
that are implied by each possible w value.
The advantage of this calibration approach is that it is based on a direct survey of
households that includes both of the variables of interest, income and the attribute used for
calibration. No ecological regression is needed. The disadvantage of this approach is that it
relies on household reporting of not just annual income, but also average monthly electricity
bill. It seems quite likely that this would be a fairly noisy measure. The estimation,
however, is a regression of monthly bill on income bracket dummies, so the recall error on
monthly bill may not be a problem if it is orthogonal to income. If income is reported
with error, however, the estimates will tend to understate the actual bill diﬀerences across
income brackets and bias downward estimates of w∗.30 Likewise, the weighted location
matching could bias the estimates, though it is diﬃcult to know in which direction.
Just as with the ecological regression approach, this approach yields a point estimate of
w∗ and a distribution of the parameter estimate using the bootstrap method. Due to the
large dataset — about 40,000 households in SCE territory — and simple mean calculation,
however, the distribution is quite narrow. For SCE, the estimated w∗ is 0.13 with a 95%
conﬁdence interval of [0.11,0.16].31 The implied annual bills and transfers are shown in
T a b l e4 . E v e nw i t ham e a nw∗ estimate much closer to zero (random rank) than one
(usage rank), the estimates of transfers for the lowest and highest income brackets are
substantially diﬀerent from the random rank results.
The random rank method is based on the same assumption of within-CBG orthogonality
between electricity consumption and income as one would be making if one used median
household income by CBG. The diﬀerence between the results using the random rank
method and the results from the weighted ranking methods provide a guide to the bias
caused by this orthogonality assumption in this particular empirical investigation. The
size of this bias for other studies, of course, will vary depending on the degree of actual
within-CBG correlation between income and the variable of interest.
30 Recall bias is probably much less of an issue with the ecological regression calibration method. Even if
individual households recall their income with error, the shares of households in each bracket are likely
to be fairly accurate so long as the recall errors are uncorrelated.
31 In the 1000 bootstrap estimates, the mean w∗ is 0.14 and median is 0.14.
23It is important to note again two central assumptions on which these results are based,
perfectly inelastic demand and no other program for low-income customers. In the next
two sections, I address and relax these assumptions.
VIII. Demand Elasticity and the Eﬃciency Costs of Income Redistribution
In this section, I show that incorporating reasonable elasticity estimates changes the
income redistribution results fairly little, but does suggest that the eﬃciency costs of an
IBP tariﬀ may be substantial in comparison to the redistribution that is accomplished.
Incorporating demand elasticity requires two critical pieces of data: the elasticity of
demand and the marginal cost for marginal changes in production. Unfortunately, reliable
estimates of the relevant elasticity for this analysis are diﬃcult to come by and the true
long-run marginal cost of electricity production and delivery is the subject of quite a bit
of disagreement. Therefore, I proceed by analyzing the results over a range of demand
elasticity and marginal cost assumptions.
In this analysis, the assumption about price elasticity also requires an assumption about
the price to which customers respond. Do consumers actually respond to the marginal
price they end up facing at the end of the billing period? Or do they respond to average
price, or to some weighted average of the marginal price in the neighborhood of their
typical consumption? In ongoing research, I am exploring this topic in detail.32 For
the purpose of these calculations, I make the conventional assumption that consumers
respond to actual ex post marginal price for the billing period. I then examine a range
of demand elasticities from zero (the previous results) to -0.3, in all cases assuming a
constant elasticity functional form of demand. Longer run estimates of electricity demand
elasticity are generally at the more elastic end of this range (or even larger, in absolute
value), but they have not explicitly examined how well customers understand the IBP
tariﬀ and whether they would demonstrate the same elasticity in response to large changes
in marginal price that have fairly small eﬀects on the average price that most customers
face.33
In order to maintain the assumption that the tariﬀ change is proﬁt-neutral for the utility,
analysis of the consumer surplus change with non-zero demand elasticity also requires an
32 See Borenstein (2009).
33 A further complication is that elasticities may diﬀer in a way that is correlated with household con-
sumption, but reliable estimates of such diﬀerences do not exist. It is also certainly possible that the
constant elasticity functional form of demand is not the most accurate description, but unfortunately
existing research does not provide very useful guidance on this subject either.
24assumption about the marginal cost of quantity changes. For this analysis, I start out with
the assumption that the long-run marginal cost of incremental quantity changes is equal
to the average cost under the existing tariﬀs, which is equal to the average price under
the assumption that the existing tariﬀ is break-even. This is the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ in the
previous section, in the case of SCE, $0.1592/kWh. One could argue that this is too high
— because this price included covering sunk losses from the 2000-01 California electricity
crisis (and some long-term contracts signed shortly after) or because there are economies
of scale in at least the electricity distribution activity — or too low — due to constraints
on the expansion of cost-eﬀective generation, for instance from regulatory constraints on
building new fossil fuel power plants or new transmission lines.34 I return below to the
robustness of the results to diﬀerent marginal cost assumptions. I show that for small
elasticities the income redistribution results are less sensitive than one might expect to the
MC assumption, because it aﬀects only the cost change that results from the net change
in quantity as some consumers increase consumption when their marginal price falls and
others decrease consumption as their marginal price rises. The analysis of the deadweight
loss from IBP, however, is much more sensitive to marginal cost.
The approach I take is to calculate the change in consumption of each consumer in each
billing period when the tariﬀ changes from the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to the benchmark 5-tier tariﬀ
that is shown in Table 1. Because the actual quantities observed were for customers facing
the 5-tier tariﬀ, however, the quantities consumed under the alternative ﬂat rate tariﬀ
depend on the elasticity assumption. Total consumption tends to be larger under the ﬂat
rate tariﬀ because about half of the customers are on blocks 3, 4, or 5, while the other
half of customers are on blocks 1 or 2 for marginal consumption. The customers on blocks
3, 4, and 5 are large-demand customers and see a substantially lower marginal price with
a ﬂat rate tariﬀ, while those on blocks 1 and 2 are small customers and see a somewhat
higher marginal price under a ﬂat rate tariﬀ. Because output expands under the ﬂat rate
compared to the ﬁve-tier tariﬀ, the break-even ﬂat rate tariﬀ must rise if marginal cost is
above average cost or fall if marginal cost is below average cost.
34 One possible benchmark for the marginal cost of power is the regulator’s analysis. The California Public
Utilities Commission each year creates a “Market Price Referent” (MPR) that is used as an indicator
price below which oﬀers to the utilities from merchant generators will automatically be considered just
and reasonable by the regulator. The Market Price Referent in 2006 for long-term power purchases was
about $0.085/kWh. This is a wholesale power price, however, and does not include transmission and
distribution (T&D, including billing) costs. T&D costs average about $0.04/kWh and the marginal cost
is probably somewhat lower than that, though not all regulatory analysts would agree that marginal
T&D costs are below average. Still, a long-run marginal cost of between $0.11 and $0.12 is fairly
defensible if one excludes environmental externalities that are not priced in the MPR. If greenhouse
gases were priced at $30/ton — which is in the range contemplated in current proposed legislation —
this would raise the cost of power by about 1.5 cents per kWh in California because that would be the
emissions cost of a gas-ﬁred power plant that is most often setting the market price.
25For brevity, I focus here on results using calibration method A, the ecological regression
results. Using method B, calibrating on reported monthly electricity bill in the ACS, yields
similar results, though all redistribution eﬀects are smaller.
The changes in annual average household consumer surplus by income bracket are shown
in the middle columns of Table 5. The second panel (in bold) of Table 5 displays results
under the assumption that marginal cost is $0.1592/kWh, the actual average revenue per
kWh that SCE collected. The top panel shows results under the alternative assumption
that MC =$0.1092/kWh, ﬁve cents lower and possibly a more accurate indication of
marginal cost if no environmental costs are incurred. The third panel shows results under
the alternative assumption that MC =$0.2092/kWh, ﬁve cents higher and potentially more
accurate if expansion of generation, transmission, and distribution is severely constrained
or environmental costs are very high.35
Focusing ﬁrst on the middle columns of the second panel, the   = 0 column replicates the
results from Table 4, though with the sign reversed because I am now considering change
in consumer surplus rather than the change in the bill. The next three columns to the
right show the change in average household consumer surplus under increasing elasticity
assumptions. They indicate that incorporating more elastic demand changes the results
but not the qualitative inference.36 Over the alternative elasticity assumptions from zero
to -0.3, the estimated average consumer surplus gain for households in the poorest income
bracket due to the IBP tariﬀ are all in the range of about $9-$11 per month, which is 16%
to 19% of their estimated bills under the existing 5-tier tariﬀ.37
Incorporating the elasticity of electricity demand leads to the question of the tradeoﬀ be-
tween income redistribution and economic eﬃciency. The four right-hand columns present
the aggregate transfers, in millions of dollars per year, to or from each income bracket,
35 Raising the marginal cost of production by ﬁve cents due to greenhouse gas emissions alone, however,
would require a price on GHGs of around $100 per ton of CO2 equivalent.
36 Incorporating demand elasticity necessarily, by revealed preference, makes more positive (or less nega-
tive) the change in consumer surplus caused by a change from the observed price structure and associated
quantities to any given alternative. In this case, the sign of this eﬀect is ambiguous, however, because I
am evaluating the change from a hypothetical alternative ﬂat rate to the IBP price structure at which
quantity has been actually observed. That is, the change in elasticity assumption pivots the demand
curve around the point at which it is intersecting the 5-tier price schedule.
37 In examining consumption responses to changes in the tariﬀ, these calculations ignore income eﬀects.
Even for customers in the lowest income bracket these are likely to be very small, amounting to about
1% of their income. Estimates of the income elasticity of demand vary greatly, but even if it assumed to
be 1.5 in the long run — which is towards the high end of the distribution of estimates in the literature
— the quantity eﬀect from the income change would be in the noise of these estimates.
26taking into account the share of households in each bracket. Because these calculations
were carried out for a break-even utility, the diﬀerence in deadweight loss between the IBP
tariﬀ and the ﬂat rate is simply the aggregate change in consumer surplus that occurs with
the switch from one to the other. This is shown in the row beneath the four right-hand
columns.
For example, with a demand elasticity of -0.1, switching from a ﬂat rate tariﬀ to the
5-tier tariﬀ raises deadweight loss by $67 million per year, reducing the consumer surplus of
households in the two highest income brackets by $240 million per year (=$198+$42), while
increasing by $173 million per year the consumer surplus of households in the other three
income brackets, with $160 million per year of that going to households in the two lowest
income brackets. The second row beneath the right-hand columns reports the ratio of the
dealweight loss to the amount of income transfered to households in the two lowest income
brackets, i.e., households with annual income below $40,000 per year. This seems to be a
somewhat ineﬃcient redistributional program. The 0.42 ratio is slightly higher than the
range of many estimates of the marginal cost of public funds. Those estimates generally do
not include the increase or decline in distortion that could result from the distribution of
those funds to lower income households, through for instance either reductions in payroll
taxes or distorted prices on subsidized goods.38 The ratio, however, is much higher if
the elasticity of demand is -0.2 or -0.3. The ratios are substantially higher (ranging from
roughly 0.77 to 4.06) for PG&E which has a steeper IBP tariﬀ, and about the same (ranging
from 0.35 to 1.31) for SDG&E.
Conceptually, the deadweight loss impact of a switch from a ﬂat rate to an IBP tariﬀ can
be decomposed into the resulting inter-buyer misallocation of any given total quantity of
electricity — which results from buyers facing heterogeneous prices for marginal purchases
under IBP — and ineﬃcient aggregate consumption of electricity — which results from the
marginal price diﬀering from marginal cost. The ﬂat rate tariﬀ is clearly more eﬃcient in
terms of inter-buyer misallocation, but it may be more or less eﬃcient than the IBP tariﬀ
in terms of optimizing total consumption, depending on how closely each tariﬀ reﬂects
marginal cost across all consumers. In the case of the second panel in Table 5 the ﬂat
rate tariﬀ is reducing deadweight loss to zero by setting price equal to marginal cost for
all customers.
Though it may be tempting to conclude that the case in which the ﬂat rate tariﬀ is
equal to marginal cost maximizes the deadweight loss advantage of a ﬂat rate tariﬀ over
38 See Ballard & Fullerton (1992) and Snow & Warren (1996).
27MC=0.1092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $114 $97 $80 $93 $82 $70 $58
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $71 $49 $25 $82 $64 $44 $22
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $5 -$23 -$54 $24 $4 -$18 -$41
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$56 -$89 -$126 -$24 -$53 -$85 -$120
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$298 -$348 -$403 -$177 -$210 -$245 -$284
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $113 $234 $365
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.77 2.05 4.56
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1577 $0.1560 $0.1543
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $121 $113 $105 $93 $88 $82 $76
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $81 $69 $57 $82 $72 $62 $51
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $16 $1 -$16 $24 $13 $0 -$12
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$44 -$63 -$83 -$24 -$42 -$60 -$79
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$281 -$313 -$345 -$177 -$198 -$220 -$243
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $67 $136 $207
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.42 0.95 1.63
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1592 $0.1592 $0.1592
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $128 $128 $128 $93 $93 $92 $92
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $90 $87 $87 $82 $80 $78 $78
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $27 $21 $21 $24 $20 $16 $16
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$32 -$40 -$40 -$24 -$31 -$38 -$38
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$266 -$281 -$281 -$177 -$187 -$198 -$198
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $24 $49 $49
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.29
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1606 $0.1620 $0.1633
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $135 $140 $144 $93 $98 $101 $104
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $98 $103 $107 $82 $88 $92 $95
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $37 $40 $43 $24 $28 $31 $33
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$21 -$19 -$17 -$24 -$20 -$18 -$16
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$251 -$253 -$255 -$177 -$177 -$178 -$179
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 -$16 -$28 -$37
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.18
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1619 $0.1645 $0.1669
Table 5: Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from Flat-rate to
5-tier Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
increasing-block pricing, that is not the case. In this empirical analysis, the deadweight
loss diﬀerence is even larger if marginal cost is lower. While a lower marginal cost (holding
constant the ﬁrm’s total cost at the observed quantities) increases deadweight loss under
ﬂat rate pricing, in this case it increases the deadweight loss under the IBP structure by
28even more. This diﬀerence is shown in the top panel of Table 5, where for a given elasticity,
the deadweight loss diﬀerence is substantially larger than in the second panel. The intuition
here is that the deadweight loss induced by moving the marginal price slightly above or
below marginal cost is second order, but increases with the square of that diﬀerence. Thus,
the change in deadweight loss if marginal cost is $0.1092 instead of $0.1592 is quite large
for customers who are out on the ﬁfth tier paying around $0.30 per kWh.
Conversely, if marginal cost is well above average cost, the case shown in the bottom
panels, increasing-block pricing induces much less deadweight loss because the many cus-
tomers out on the higher tiers (who are also the high-use consumers) are facing prices
that are much closer to marginal cost. An intuitive extreme case would be if all customers
were on the ﬁfth tier and marginal cost were equal to the ﬁfth tier price, but the ﬁrm was
still breaking even due to marginal cost being well above average cost. In that case, the
increasing-block pricing would eliminate deadweight loss, while switching to a break-even
ﬂat-rate tariﬀ would induce substantial deadweight loss.
In fact, in the present case, if the marginal cost were $0.2592/kWh (the bottom panel),
a switch from a break-even ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to the benchmark 5-tier tariﬀ would reduce
deadweight loss while also transferring income from richer to poorer households. This was
almost certainly not the case for California in 2006, though it is worth keeping in mind for
cases in which ﬁrms have fairly low historical costs but face severe constraints on output
expansion. On the other hand, if marginal cost were actually in the range of $0.11-$0.16, as
seems likely to have been the case for SCE in 2006, increasing-block pricing was probably a
fairly ineﬃcient way of transferring income to poorer households.39 The results for PG&E
and SDG&E indicate the same tradeoﬀ: the deadweight loss cost of redistributing income
through IBP is fairly high if marginal cost is below average cost, but is lower if marginal
cost is above average cost and could be negative if marginal cost were around $0.25/kWh
or higher.
It is worth noting two considerations that this analysis does not incorporate. First, the
deadweight loss calculations assume that there are no other distortions in the economy,
but in fact we start from a situation far from the ﬁrst best due to taxes on labor and
other commodities. Intuitively, the distortion due to above-marginal-cost pricing of elec-
39 This discussion ignores the “conservation motive” that is frequently suggested as another reason for using
IBP. It is diﬃcult to reconcile such arguments with a marginal cost that is well below the highest-tier
prices unless one incorporates behavioral considerations. If a very high marginal price gets households
to make energy eﬃciency investments that actually pay oﬀ even if price equals the much-lower true
social marginal cost — but for some reason households were unwilling to make these investments under
a less extreme marginal price — then the analysis would be more favorable to IBP.
29tricity exacerbates the pre-existing labor supply distortion resulting from income taxes
by reducing the real after-tax wage.40 Below-marginal-cost pricing of electricity for some
customers, however, may reduce the pre-existing labor supply distortion. The net impact
of these eﬀects is diﬃcult to calculate, but it is worth pointing out that the customers
charged above-marginal-cost electricity prices are disproportionately those who already
face high marginal tax rates on labor, while those charged below-marginal-cost prices tend
to be in lower marginal tax brackets and are thus likely to engender smaller pre-existing
distortions from the tax on labor. So it seems likely that incorporating this indirect tax
distortion would raise the estimated deadweight loss. Second, there is signiﬁcant theo-
retical and empirical support for the idea that customers do not respond to the ex post
observed marginal price that they face, but rather to some average of marginal prices over
at the range of potential consumption, or to just an average price for the month.41 These
eﬀects could reduce the deadweight loss from IBP.42
IX. Increasing-Block Pricing Versus A Tariﬀ for Low-Income Households
While IBP is generally aimed at protecting low-income customers, many policymakers
and economists argue for a means-tested program for the poor rather than a price schedule
that distorts prices for all consumers and only redistributes to the poor indirectly through
the correlation with usage. And, of course, virtually all economists would prefer to see
lump-sum transfers, rather than price distortions. Means-tested programs, however, raise
their own set of concerns, most notably the diﬃculty in identifying and enrolling low-
income, and only low-income, customers. Nearly every state has some form of means-tested
assistance for energy bills in addition to the federal government’s Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP).43
The CARE (California Alternate Rates for Energy) program in California is a discounted
electricity tariﬀ targeted at low-income households. As shown in Table 1, the CARE
program is also an increasing-block price schedule for electricity, but each block’s price is
40 See Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
41 See Shin (1985), Borenstein (2009) and Ito (2010) on electricity. Saez (2002) explores a closely related
i s s u ei ni n c o m et a xe ﬀ e c t s .
42 If customers respond to the “proximate marginal price” in the range of their expected consumption,
then this would probably change the deadweight loss calculation very little, but if they actually respond
to their average price over the whole billing period, then for a given demand elasticity, IBP would create
substantially less deadweight loss than calculated here.
43 Summaries of each state’s programs are at http://liheap.ncat.org/sp.htm .
30discounted oﬀ of the standard residential tariﬀ. The discounts are not the same on each
tier. Thus, the CARE program delivers a lower average electricity price and a diﬀerent
structure of increasing-block pricing.
Despite the lower prices oﬀered under CARE, the utilities have had a diﬃcult time get-
ting all or nearly all of the eligible customers to sign up for the program. After many years
of signiﬁcant eﬀorts by the utilities and independent poverty-assistance programs, the util-
ities report penetration rates among eligible households of 70%-80%. Unfortuately, those
ﬁgures probably overstate the program eﬀectiveness because they are calculated by divid-
ing the number of CARE participants by an estimate of the number of eligible households.
Implicitly, such a calculation assumes that all households on CARE are eligible, but some
data suggest that the reality may be substantially diﬀerent, as discussed in the appendix.
Nonetheless, for this analysis, I base my calculations on the reported ﬁgures recognizing
that the results probably overstate the degree of income redistribution accomplished by
the CARE program.
To examine the transfers resulting from CARE, it is useful to separate the lower average
price from the increasing-block nature of each tariﬀ. To do this, I ﬁrst consider the case
of diﬀerent ﬂat-rate tariﬀs for CARE and non-CARE customers. Once again assuming
zero demand elasticity, it is straightforward to create separate revenue-neutral ﬂat-rate
tariﬀs for each group. These are shown in the lower left-hand panel of Table 1. CARE
participation is indicated in the billing data for each household, so one can then easily
assess the change in each household’s bills with the introduction of the CARE program
under a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, and under a 5-tier tariﬀ.44
Table 6 shows the average annual bills by income bracket under four alternative scenarios
using the ecological regression calibration method.45 The eﬀect of the CARE program and
5-tier tariﬀ on average bills by income bracket are shown separately and combined in the
right-hand columns, both as monetary and percentage changes from the ﬂat-tariﬀ/No-
44 Throughout this study, I have assumed that tariﬀ changes would be revenue neutral. That is unlikely to
be exactly true with CARE, because more than half of the subsidy comes from surcharges on commercial,
industrial, and agricultural electricity bills. However, it is impossible to predict how a change in the
CARE program would alter the cross-subsidies between these customer classes, and very diﬃcult to
determine how the impact of bill changes among these non-residential customer classes is shared among
households of diﬀerent income brackets. Therefore, I maintain the assumption that changes in CARE
would be ﬁnanced by changes in the non-CARE residential rates. Absent elastic responses, this is
equivalent to assuming that the incidence of changes in electricity costs for non-residential customers
are borne entirely by residential customers of the same utility and allocated in the same proportion as
their residential electricity bills.
45 Results using both calibration methods for all three utilities are shown in the appendix.
31     Monetary Bill Chage Percentage Bill Chage
         Average Annualized Bill      from No-CARE/Flat      from No-CARE/Flat
        No-CARE        with CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE
Income Flat 5-tier Flat 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier
Range Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
$0-$20k $794 $665 $618 $558 -$129 -$176 -$236 -16% -22% -30%
$20k-$40k $976 $884 $865 $808 -$92 -$111 -$168 -9% -11% -17%
$40k-$60k $1,122 $1,090 $1,158 $1,108 -$32 $36 -$15 -3% 3% -1%
$60k-$100k $1,236 $1,261 $1,339 $1,328 $25 $103 $92 2% 8% 7%
>$100k $1,638 $1,889 $1,781 $1,985 $251 $143 $347 15% 9% 21%
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
All results are from weighted rank method A - calibrated from ecological regression results
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers
Table 6: Estimated Average Annual Bills With and Without IBP and CARE
CARE results. A ﬂat-rate tariﬀ for both non-CARE and CARE customers — maintaining
the average discount of 39% for CARE customers that results from the current program —
would reduce the average bill for households in the lowest income bracket to $618 versus
$665 if the IBP tariﬀ was oﬀered, but with no means-tested program. Of course, such a
comparison depends entirely on the size of the CARE discount and the steepness of IBP.
Some other insights from Table 6 are likely to be more general, however. Comparing the
bill changes from No-CARE/5-tier with those from CARE/ﬂat-rate, it is apparent that
a substantially smaller share of the funds that CARE redistributes come from the very
wealthiest customers. Rather, the cost of the transfers are shared more by households in
the next highest income bracket and even in the middle bracket. In that sense, a CARE-
like program may be less progressive than IBP. This result, which holds true for all three
utilities, reﬂects the fact that the CARE program is ﬁnanced by raising price for all non-
CARE customers by the same amount per kilowatt-hour. The IBP, however, lowers price
for baseline energy by raising it the most for the heaviest users, who are disproportionately
from the highest income bracket.
The IBP and CARE programs are substitutes to some extent, so the presence of the
CARE program lowers the incremental redistributive eﬀect of the IBP (and vice versa).
The additional impact of the IBP given the CARE program is to lower the average bill of
households in the lowest income bracket by $60/year or about $5 per month, about 10%
of the bill they would face without IBP.
While the CARE program and IBP do redistribute income from wealthier to poorer
customers, they both also distort prices and potentially lower economic eﬃciency. Table 7
carries out the same type of elasticity adjustment and deadweight-loss analysis for SCE’s
CARE program that Table 5 presented for SCE’s increasing-block pricing. Comparing
Table 7 with Table 5, however, suggests that the induced deadweight loss is likely to
be much smaller per dollar transfered with the CARE program. The deadweight loss
32is drastically lower if marginal cost is around average cost or lower, the top two panels.
Even if marginal cost is slightly over $0.20/kWh, CARE creates less than half as much
deadweight loss per dollar transfered. If marginal cost is even higher, however, the ability
of IBP to reﬂect high marginal cost while maintaining a lower average price can make it
more attractive.46
These results are based on a 78% CARE penetration rate among eligible customers, as
reported by SCE for 2006, which probably overstates participation by low-income house-
holds, as explained in the appendix. Using an adjusted penetration rate of 65% (discussed
in the appendix) reduces the eﬃciency dominance of the CARE program somewhat, but
still suggests that it creates much less ineﬃciency for a given transfer to the lowest income
bracket than does IBP.47
A complete comparison between IBP and CARE would require a much more extensive
study of the eligibility and consumption of households on CARE. Faced with great diﬃculty
signing up customers who qualify for the lower rates, utilities and the regulator in California
have focused more on reducing the number of eligible customers who don’t take advantage
of the program than on tracking down ineligible customers who do. Nonetheless, over the
plausible range on CARE penetration rates and likely marginal costs, CARE redistributes
more income to the lowest income bracket per dollar of deadweight loss created than does
IBP. Under CARE, however, more of the funds for that redistribution come from middle-
income households and less from wealthy households.
Besides the diﬃculty in accurately identifying truly eligible customers, CARE-like pro-
grams also may have higher “customer acquistion” and administration costs. In fact,
program administrative costs should be considered in analyzing both IBP and CARE. No
data are available on the additional administrative cost of IBP versus a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ,
though it seems likely to be quite small due to the fact that it is mandatory and calculated
automatically in the billing process. In contrast, the utilities ﬁle detailed reports on their
CARE program administration costs. For 2006, SCE reported its costs were $4.2 million of
46 These deadweight loss calculations raise the same issue of pre-existing labor market distortions as in the
previous section, though the correlation between high prices and high marginal tax brackets is probably
not as great in this case. Another possible distortion, however, is the disincentive to increase income
if it would disqualify one from the CARE program. Still, such an eﬀect is likely to be very small in
most cases given the size of electricity bill savings relative to the potential chang in income and, more
importantly, due to the extremely weak enforcement of the income eligibility rules for CARE.
47 The lower penetration rate yields virtually the same deadweight loss as in Table 7, but reduces the
transfers by about 15%.
33MC=0.1092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $178 $182 $186 $127 $129 $131 $134
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $114 $117 $120 $99 $102 $104 $107
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$37 -$38 -$40 -$27 -$28 -$29 -$30
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$108 -$113 -$118 -$99 -$103 -$108 -$113
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$151 -$160 -$171 -$101 -$106 -$113 -$120
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $7 $14 $22
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1717 $0.1703 $0.1687
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1052 $0.1043 $0.1033
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $180 $184 $189 $127 $130 $133 $137
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $114 $118 $122 $99 $102 $105 $109
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$38 -$40 -$42 -$27 -$29 -$30 -$32
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$109 -$116 -$123 -$99 -$104 -$111 -$117
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$154 -$165 -$177 -$101 -$108 -$116 -$125
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $9 $19 $29
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1735 $0.1739 $0.1743
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1062 $0.1065 $0.1067
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $181 $186 $192 $127 $131 $135 $139
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $115 $119 $123 $99 $102 $106 $110
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$38 -$41 -$44 -$27 -$29 -$31 -$34
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$111 -$118 -$127 -$99 -$106 -$113 -$121
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$156 -$169 -$182 -$101 -$110 -$119 -$128
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $11 $23 $34
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.14
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1751 $0.1771 $0.1790
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1072 $0.1085 $0.1096
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $182 $188 $194 $127 $132 $136 $140
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $115 $119 $124 $99 $103 $107 $111
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$39 -$43 -$46 -$27 -$30 -$32 -$35
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$112 -$121 -$130 -$99 -$107 -$116 -$124
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$158 -$172 -$187 -$101 -$111 -$121 -$131
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $14 $27 $39
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.16
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1767 $0.1800 $0.1831
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1082 $0.1102 $0.1121
Table 7: Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from No-CARE to w/CARE
With Flat-rate Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
which about two-thirds were “outreach” and “processing, certiﬁcation and veriﬁcation.”48
In comparing the deadweight loss calculations in Tables 5 and 7, however, adding $4.2
48 See Southern California Edison (2007).
34million to the CARE costs doesn’t qualitatively change the analysis.
X. Conclusion
Increasing-block pricing has long been seen as a way to ensure nearly every household
can aﬀord a basic quantity of electricity while raising additional revenue from wealthier
customers. As electricity costs rise, due to increases in fuel prices and additional greenhouse
gas permit costs, electric utilities and their regulators are again focusing on ways to balance
equity concerns with eﬃciency and the need to meet the company’s budget constraints. As
a result, there is renewed interest in IBP. The IBP tariﬀs currently in use by California’s
large utilities increase marginal price with usage much more steeply than other current or
proposed IBP tariﬀs in other states, so they are a useful guidepost to the eﬀects that such
tariﬀs may have.
While it is generally agreed that wealthier customers on average consume larger quanti-
ties of electricity per person, it is less clear how strong that association is between wealth
and household consumption after adjusting for diﬀerential numbers of household members.
The impact of the steeply-tiered rates in protecting low-income customers is also no doubt
mitigated by the existence of the CARE program that oﬀers lower rates to low-income
households in California. Similar programs exist in most states in the U.S.49
With access to residence-level electricity consumption, but only census block group data
on income distribution, I have attempted to create an eﬀective matching of households to
incomes in order to infer the income redistribution impact of alternative electricity tariﬀs.
Some previous studies facing similar challenges have assigned the median household income
of each census block group to all households in the CBG. Actual household incomes within
CBGs, however, are quite heterogeneous. Matching to median income compresses the
apparent income distribution substantially and does not take account of the within-CBG
correlation of household incomes with the program variable of interest. The approach
explored here seems likely to be adaptable to other situations in which household-level
data are available on the program variable, but income data are not.
I ﬁnd that California’s IBP tariﬀs do redistribute income on average from wealthier
to poorer households, but the eﬀect is fairly modest. This is due in part to the CARE
program, which targets a lower overall electricity tariﬀ at households that are deemed to
be low income. If the CARE program were not present, I ﬁnd that the IBP would reduce
49 In California, eligibility criteria for CARE have been expanded since 2000 leading to a more than
doubling of participation in the program between 2000 and 2006.
35the bills of households in the lowest income bracket (approximately a quintile) by $9-$11
per month or around 13%-16%. The redistributional impact of the current CARE program
by itself is probably somewhat larger than the impact of the steep IBP tariﬀs in California,
but the two programs are partial substitutes in redistributing income, so combining them
beneﬁts low income households by substantially less than the sum of their separate eﬀects.
I ﬁnd that most income redistribution under IBP comes from households in the top
income bracket, while the CARE program spreads the contribution burden more evenly
among middle income and wealthy households, so IBP does seem to be more progressive.
The CARE program, however, creates substantially less deadweight loss, because the prices
that would result from the CARE program alone would more closely reﬂect the current
marginal cost of electricity. Thus, it seems that if marginal cost is near or well below
average cost, a mean-tested tariﬀ for poor households is likely to be a more economically
eﬃcient way to ease the burden of electricity costs for low-income customers. If a utility
is facing marginal cost well above average cost, however, IBP tariﬀs can potentially both
beneﬁt low-income households and reduce deadweight loss by setting high marginal prices
for most customers.
Two issues that have not been addressed here are worth at least a brief mention. First,
the redistributional analysis has focused on reducing average energy costs for low-income
households, an issue of “vertical equity” in public ﬁnance terms. There are also potentially
important issues of horizontal equity if similarly positioned households — where position can
include both income and electricity “need” — are treated diﬀerently in terms of prices or,
perhaps, bills. Applying horizontal equity concepts to increasing-block pricing is complex.
The challenge is also apparent with means-tested programs, such as CARE. If imperfect
information or aversion to sharing household details causes some eligible customers to
enroll in CARE while others don’t, that too raises issues of horizontal equity.
Second, I have not addressed the question of why electricity regulators should consider
income distribution or aﬀordability of electricity at all in setting tariﬀ structures. The
standard economic argument is that such issues are best addressed through economy-wide
tax policy, not in the pricing of speciﬁc goods. While there is a great deal of logic and
intellectual support for that framework, there is little indication that it is winning the
argument in the regulatory arena. The fact is that nearly all electricity regulators feel
pressure or the desire to address the issue of aﬀordability of this speciﬁc good. The aim of
this paper is to provide information that can at least allow that goal to be pursued more
eﬃciently.
36Appendix A: Details of Within-CBG Ranking Methods
In this appendix, I describe in detail the calibration methods based on ecological regres-
sion estimation of household usage and based on average bill by income category infered
from the American Community Survey. First, I explain how CARE participation informa-
tion is integrated into all of the within-CBG ranking. This applies to the usage-rank and
random-rank methods as well as the calibration methods.
Utilization of CARE participation information in ranking methods
Reports from the utilities suggest that the CARE participation rate was 70%-80% among
eligible households in 2006. The ﬁgures, however, appear to come from dividing the number
of participating households by an estimate of the number of eligible households, based on
census data. Implicitly, that assumes that all households on CARE are eligible. There is
some evidence that this is not a good approximation.
One issue is that households may be qualiﬁed when they sign up, but then become
ineligible due to an income increase or a decrease in the number of household residents.
The calculation implicitly assumes that households report immediately when they become
ineligible, which seems to be fairly rare. Instead, it appears from CARE dropout rates,
which spike at the end of the two-year eligibility recertiﬁcation period, that households
that are no longer eligible simply do not recertify at renewal time. Given that 5% to 10%
of households that are on CARE do not recertify when their renewal is required, it seems
quite likely that at least a few percent of households on CARE have become ineligible since
they enrolled.
In addition, some households may not be eligible at the time they join. The sign-up
process requires a statement of eligibility, but does not require supporting evidence to
be submitted. Much of CARE enrollment comes from contacting households that have
qualiﬁed for other low-income programs, but one can also sign up through the websites
of the utilities or by mail. In their monthly and annual reports, the utilities report the
results of random eligibility veriﬁcation which is requested from about 1% of participants
annually. A surprisingly high number of participants selected for the random veriﬁcation
do not respond to the request for supporting information, over half in 2006 for SCE and
PG&E, about one-quarter for SDG&E, and as a result are subject to being dropped from
the CARE program (though it is unclear how quickly that happens). A much smaller
share are found to be ineligible based on documentation submitted. It is diﬃcult to know
how many of the non-respondents are unable or unwilling to provide documentation, but
are actually eligible. Still, that seems unlikely to be the explanation for all of the non-
respondents.
Despite these concerns, in the study I have assumed a CARE penetration rate based on
78% participation (for SCE) for the algorithm described below. Based on the failure to
recertify at the two-year interval and the low rate of response to requests for eligibility for
veriﬁcation, it seems that a participation rate of 65% is quite plausible, but there has been
37no study of ineligible participants on CARE.50 A lower rate of CARE participation would
mean that fewer of the households in the lowest income bracket and more of the households
in higher income brackets are assumed to be CARE participants. Assuming that fewer
of the CARE participants are in the lowest bracket leads to the conclusion of somewhat
higher redistribution resulting from increasing-block pricing. If a much larger share of
CARE participants were actually ineligible, then the redistributive impact of CARE would
be smaller than is commonly assumed and the redistributive impact of increasing-block
pricing would be greater than I have concluded.
To incorporate the CARE information and allocate CARE customers across income
brackets, the CBG income distribution data are ﬁrst used to determine the share of the
households in the CBG that will fall into each of the ﬁve income brackets. From the billing
data, we know the total number of CARE customers in the CBG. So, starting from the
lowest income bracket 78% of the household “slots” are allocated to CARE customers.51
For instance, if the total number of CARE customers in the CBG is less than 78% of the
household “slots” in the lowest income bracket, then all CARE customers are assumed to
fall in the lowest income bracket.52 If the total number of CARE customers in the CBG is
greater than 78% of the household slots in the lowest bracket, then 78% of the slots in that
bracket are allocated to CARE customers and remaining CARE customers are carried over
to the second lowest income bracket. The same algorithm is then applied to the second
lowest income bracket and if there are remaining customers, they are carried over to the
third lowest income bracket, and so on. In the extremely small number of cases where this
algorithm yielded leftover CARE customers beyond the highest income bracket, i.e., the
number of CARE customers exceeded 78% of the total number of households that received
utility bills in the CBG, the CARE customers were simply divided proportionately across
the population.
To be concrete, assume that a census block group has H households that receive electric-
ity bills and the billing data indicate that Hc of them are on the CARE program. Assume
that, according to the census, the shares of population in the income brackets are s1,...,s5
where s1 is the lowest income bracket. Finally, assume that the share of customers eligible
for CARE who actually sign up, i.e., the CARE participation rate, is p. Then, with sic
representing the share of all customers in the CBG who are in income bracket i and are
on the CARE program, the allocation can be broken into six cases:
50 There are many reasons that an eligible household might not respond to the request for veriﬁcation,
including language barriers, concern about privacy, and undocumented immigration status.
51 I present the algorithm in terms of household “slots,” but it is somewhat more complicated because
many households are in the sample for less than the full 365 days of the year. In practice, this means
that household-days, rather than households, are allocated across the income brackets.
52 Virtually all of these customers should be signing up for the CARE program, but the participation rate
is well below 100%, as discussed above.
381. If Hps1 >H c then s1c = Hc
H ,s 2c = s3c = s4c = s5c =0 ;
2. If Hps1 <H c <Hp (s1 + s2)t h e ns1c = ps1,s 2c = Hc−s1cH
Hs2 ,s 3c = s4c = s5c =0 ;
3. If Hp(s1 + s2) <H c <H p (s1 + s2 + s3)t h e n
s1c = ps1,s 2c = ps2,s 3c =
Hc−(s1c+s2c)H
Hs3 ,s 4c = s5c =0 ;
4. If Hp(s1 + s2 + s3) <H c <Hp (s1 + s2 + s3 + s4)t h e n
s1c = ps1,s 2c = ps2,s 3c = ps3,s 4c =
Hc−(s1c+s2c+s3c)H
Hs4 ,s 5c =0 ;
5. If Hp(s1 + s2 + s3 + s4) <H c <Hp (s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 + s5)t h e n
s1c = ps1,s 2c = ps2,s 3c = ps3,s 4c = ps4,s 5c =
Hc−(s1c+s2c+s3c+s4c)H
Hs5 ;
6. If Hp <Hc then s1c = Hc
H s1,s 2c = Hc
H s2,s 3c = Hc
H s3,s 4c = Hc
H s4,s 5c = Hc
H s5.
For each case, the share of all customers who are in income bracket i and are not on the
CARE program, is sin = si − sic.
This approach determined the average CARE penetration in each income bracket. That
average rate was assumed to hold in every CBG up to a constant mulitplier. So, for
instance, if applying these penetration rates within a CBG would create fewer CARE
customers than were actually in the CBG, penetration rates in all income brackets were
scaled up to exactly match the actual number of CARE customers. Wherever possible,
the ratio of penetration rates across income categories was held constant. In the instances
where this was not possible because it implied a penetration rate of greater than 100%,
that income bracket was assumed to be 100% CARE customers and the “overﬂow” was
allocated to the other brackets so as to maintain their relative penetration rates. The share
of all customers allocated to each income bracket who are on CARE using this allocation
approach is shown in Table 6.
Detailed description of weighted ranking method A: ecological regression
To obtain estimates of average electricity usage by income bracket, I run the following









where HIg is the median household income in census block group g, CDD is the sum of
daily cooling degree days in the CBG, CDDsq is the sum of squares of daily cooling degree





t=1,365 CDDt)2), HDD is the sum of daily
heating degree days in the CBG, HDDsq is the sum of squares of daily heating degree
days in the CBG.
39The top panel of Table A1 shows the results of this regression for SCE. The estimated
average consumption of a household in income bracket b in census block group g is then
ˆ ¯ qbg =ˆ αb + ˆ βbHIg +ˆ γ1bCDDg +ˆ γ2bCDDsqg +ˆ γ3bHDDg +ˆ γ4bHDDsqg. [A2]
.
Using the coeﬃcients from [A2], the estimated average consumption of households in
income bracket b is then
ˆ ¯ qb =ˆ αb + ˆ βb ¯ HIb +ˆ γ1b ¯ CDDb +ˆ γ2b ¯ CDDsqb +ˆ γ3b ¯ HDDb +ˆ γ4b ¯ HDDsqb. [A3]
where ¯ HIb is the weighted-average median household income where the weights are the
share of bracket b customers in each census block group and likewise for the other terms
(thus the b subscripts on the right-hand side variables).53
The resulting ˆ ¯ qb are shown just below the regression in Table A1. Each possible weighting
of the usage and random ranks, w, generates a within-CBG ranking of households by
income and a resulting ˜ qbg(w) for each income bracket in each CBG. From these, I calculate





sb · [˜ qb(w) − ˆ ¯ qb]2
where sb is the share of the population in income bracket b.T h e v a l u e o f w that mini-
mizes G is then w∗, the weighting of the random-rank and usage-rank methods that best
calibrates the ancillary attribute. 1000 bootstrap estimates of equation [A1] then yield the
distribution of w∗ from which the distribution of income transfers are derived.
Detailed description of weighted ranking method B: survey on average electricity bill
The American Community Survey yields approximately 120,000 household surveys for
California during 2006. The only location information for each household is the Public
Use Microdata Area (PUMA), each of which includes about 100,000 households, so many
PUMAs overlap the boundary of each utility’s service territory and there is no way to know
which households in those PUMAs are in the utility’s territory. To match households to
service territories, I ﬁrst extract from the billing data 7-digit zip codes for each utility’s
service area.54 I then match them to the 7-digit zip codes included in each PUMA. If
the utility shows residential customers in φ percent of the 7-digit zip codes included in
53 For each of the three utilities, the median household income interaction terms, as well as the cooling
degree days and heating degree days interaction terms, were jointly signiﬁcant.
54 I use 7-digit zip code because 9-digit zip codes include many building-speciﬁc or other small area
designations in which there are no residences.
40PUMAj,t h e ne a c hh o u s e h o l di nP U M A j is given weight φ. The census also reports
household weights that align the demographics of the sample with the demographics of
the PUMA. The overall weighting of each observation is the product of these two weights.
When multiplied by the households in the survey, this yields about 1% as many households
in the survey as each utility actually serves.
Each household reports a monthly average electricity expenditure and an annual income.
To get comparable income brackets to the long-form census data, I break the ACS survey
households into ﬁve income brackets at the same percentiles as resulted from the breaks
used for the redistribution categories, e.g., in the case of SCE, at 17.9%, 40.0%, 58.9%
and 82.6%. These yielded income breaks very close to, but not exactly the same as the
$20,000, $40,000, $60,000 and $100,000 breaks. The results are barely changed using the
same dollar breaks rather than the same percentile breaks.
With the household level monthly average electricity bill Bi and the household income
bracket, I take means by weighted OLS estimation (to facilitate the bootstrap w∗ calibra-
tion) on all households that have positive weight:
Bi = α1I1 + α2I2 + α3I3 + α4I4 + α5I5 +   [A4]
where In are dummy variables for the ﬁve income brackets into which the household might
fall. The bottome panel of Table A1 reports the regression results for SCE. The coeﬃcients
in this case require no translation; they are the estimated mean bills by income bracket.
The goodness-of-ﬁt calculation and bootstrap estimation of the distribution of w∗ are
then analogous to method A. Before the goodness-of-ﬁt calculations, however, I make two
additional adjustments to account for the fact that these are imperfectly reported house-
hold electricity billing data that are then being compared to actual usage data reported by
the utility. First, household bills include daily connection charges as well as energy charges,
so I add the daily connection charges to the bills that were calculated from the utility data.
Second, even after correcting for daily connection charges, the survey reports of bills are
substantially higher on average than the utility data. This is particularly true for PG&E
and SDG&E, which send combined bills for gas and electricity.55 Because of the squared
losses nature of G, a misalignment of the distributions could distort the goodness-of-ﬁt
calculation, so I scale all of the utility-based bills up so that they have the same mean for
each utility as the average bill reported in the ACS survey for (probabilistically weighted)
households in the utility’s service territory. This adjustment turns out, however, to have
very little eﬀect.56
55 This raises interesting cognition and salience issues that I am pursuing in a separate project.
56 One further adjustment was to correct for the ACS top coding of monthly electricity bills at $540 per
month, which creates a spike in the bill distribution at $540. From the utility billing data, I calculated
the average bill for all customers with average monthly bills at or above $540 per month and then raised
every survey reported bill of $540 to that calculated average.
41Linear regression Number of obs = 7307
Dependent Variable: CBG-level average daily usage F( 29, 7277) = 281.03
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6305
Root MSE = 4.5091
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
used | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
incsh1 | 12.85795 4.645283 2.77 0.006 3.751844 21.96405
incsh2 | -8.668455 6.842066 -1.27 0.205 -22.08089 4.743979
incsh3 | -5.398217 8.862259 -0.61 0.542 -22.77082 11.97438
incsh4 | 37.72531 7.580835 4.98 0.000 22.86467 52.58594
incsh5 | -2.047782 6.758522 -0.30 0.762 -15.29644 11.20088
incsh1hh | .0000695 .0000461 1.51 0.131 -.0000208 .0001598
incsh2hh | .0001998 .0000582 3.44 0.001 .0000858 .0003138
incsh3hh | .000023 .0000606 0.38 0.704 -.0000957 .0001417
incsh4hh | -.0000279 .0000461 -0.61 0.545 -.0001184 .0000625
incsh5hh | .0002861 .0000299 9.57 0.000 .0002275 .0003447
incsh1CDD | -.0012894 .0040555 -0.32 0.751 -.0092393 .0066605
incsh2CDD | .0046847 .0064313 0.73 0.466 -.0079225 .0172919
incsh3CDD | .0029377 .0065664 0.45 0.655 -.0099343 .0158096
incsh4CDD | -.005609 .0060889 -0.92 0.357 -.017545 .006327
incsh5CDD | -.0254187 .0073676 -3.45 0.001 -.0398614 -.010976
incsh1CDDsq | .0001171 .0002042 0.57 0.566 -.0002831 .0005173
incsh2CDDsq | -.0000957 .0003307 -0.29 0.772 -.000744 .0005526
incsh3CDDsq | .0001438 .000328 0.44 0.661 -.0004993 .0007868
incsh4CDDsq | .0003045 .0003261 0.93 0.350 -.0003347 .0009438
incsh5CDDsq | .0021699 .0004424 4.90 0.000 .0013027 .0030371
incsh1HDD | -.0027365 .0032033 -0.85 0.393 -.009016 .003543
incsh2HDD | .008265 .0042177 1.96 0.050 -2.94e-06 .016533
incsh3HDD | .0134115 .0059132 2.27 0.023 .0018199 .025003
incsh4HDD | -.0147387 .005279 -2.79 0.005 -.025087 -.0043903
incsh5HDD | .0074028 .0044665 1.66 0.097 -.0013528 .0161584
incsh1HDDsq | .0001316 .0001147 1.15 0.251 -.0000933 .0003566
incsh2HDDsq | -.0001589 .0001457 -1.09 0.275 -.0004445 .0001267
incsh3HDDsq | -.0004003 .0002125 -1.88 0.060 -.0008168 .0000162
incsh4HDDsq | .0005271 .0002039 2.59 0.010 .0001275 .0009268
incsh5HDDsq | -.0000504 .0001865 -0.27 0.787 -.0004161 .0003152
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implied Daily Average Usage by Income Bracket (kWh/day):
(1) 14.787307 (2) 15.908655 (3) 15.889795 (4) 21.391435 (5) 27.921385
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Linear regression Number of obs = 60226
Dependent Variable: Monthly Average Electricity Bill F( 4, 60221) = 657.60
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.0868
Root MSE = 104.34
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
elep | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
IncBracket1 | 65.98634 .9160116 72.04 0.000 64.19096 67.78173
IncBracket2 | 78.3088 .9751486 80.30 0.000 76.39751 80.22009
IncBracket3 | 93.38179 1.317554 70.88 0.000 90.79938 95.9642
IncBracket4 | 114.8657 1.255318 91.50 0.000 112.4053 117.3262
IncBracket5 | 161.9275 1.919041 84.38 0.000 158.1662 165.6888
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE A1: Regressions for Weighted-Ranking Methods A and B
(Note: reported R-squared and F values are for regressions with constant term)Appendix B-1: Tables for Paciﬁc Gas & Electric
Tier % of Standard CARE Tier % of Standard
Baseline Residential Low-income Baseline Residential
Quantity Rate Rate Quantity Rate
                                                                                                                                                                            
Actual 2006 tariff (time-weighted average in 2006) Benchmark Five-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1143 $0.0832 1 0-100% $0.1024
2 100%-130% $0.1299 $0.0956 2 100%-130% $0.1180
3 130%-200% $0.2178 $0.0956 3 130%-200% $0.2059
4 200%-300% $0.2987 $0.0956 4 200%-300% $0.2868
5 300%+ $0.3394 $0.0956 5 300%+ $0.3275
_______________________________________ __________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                            
Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with CARE program Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with no CARE program
0%+ $0.1643 $0.0874 0%+ $0.1498
_______________________________________ __________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                            
Alternative Two-Tier Tariff with CARE program  Alternative Two-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1527 $0.0824 1 0-100% $0.1395
2 100%+ $0.1801 $0.0972 2 100%+ $0.1647
Table 1: 2006 Paciﬁc Gas & Electric Retail Electricity Rates
Residential
Usage Percentage of Residential Usage CARE/Non-CARE Shares
(million-kWh) t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5 %  U s a g e %  c u s t o m e r s
Non-CARE 24,312 57.7% 10.7% 15.5% 9.2% 6.8% 81.1% 79.2%
CARE 5,660 66.2% 10.2% 13.2% 6.7% 3.7% 18.9% 20.8%
______________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                       
Percentage of Customers on Each Tier for Marginal Consumption
t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5
Non-CARE 38.4% 14.3% 24.1% 15.1% 8.2%
CARE 47.6% 15.5% 21.5% 11.0% 4.5%
                                                                                                                                                                       
NOTE: reported results drop household accounts with consumption of less than 1 kWh/day
Table 2: Distribution of PG&E Residential Customer Consumption Across Tariﬀ Tiers
42Average Average       Change from Flat to 5-tier
Income Share of Daily Use  Annualized Bill Dollar Percent
Range Customers (kWh) Flat 2-tier 5-tier Chg 95% conf intvl Change 95% conf intvl
random $0-$20k 17.0% 17.69 $967 $958 $916 -$51 -5.3%
rank $20k-$40k 20.5% 18.49 $1,011 $1,006 $979 -$32 -3.2%
method $40k-$60k 18.0% 19.08 $1,043 $1,042 $1,032 -$10 -1.0%
$60k-$100k 23.6% 19.68 $1,075 $1,078 $1,084 $8 0.8%
>$100k 20.9% 20.92 $1,143 $1,153 $1,216 $73 6.4%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
weighted $0-$20k 17.0% 14.61 $799 $782 $701 -$98 [-$117, -$70] -12.4% [-17.0%, -7.7%]
rank $20k-$40k 20.5% 17.53 $958 $949 $899 -$59 [-$88, -$35] -6.2% [-9.8%, -3.5%]
method A $40k-$60k 18.0% 19.06 $1,042 $1,040 $1,023 -$19 [-$42, -$11] -1.8% [-4.2%, -1.0%]
$60k-$100k 23.6% 20.03 $1,095 $1,098 $1,106 $11 [$9, $12] 1.0% [0.7%, 1.1%]
>$100k 20.9% 23.97 $1,310 $1,331 $1,451 $141 [$89, $209] 10.7% [7.5%, 14.3%]
weighted $0-$20k 17.0% 16.31 $892 $879 $816 -$76 [-$81, -$70] -8.5% [-9.3%, -7.7%]
rank $20k-$40k 20.5% 18.28 $999 $994 $962 -$38 [-$40, -$35] -3.8% [-4.1%, -3.5%]
method B $40k-$60k 18.0% 19.17 $1,048 $1,047 $1,037 -$11 [-$10, -$11] -1.0% [-1.0%, -1.0%]
$60k-$100k 23.6% 19.79 $1,082 $1,084 $1,092 $10 [$10, $11] 1.0% [0.9%, 1.0%]
>$100k 20.9% 22.03 $1,204 $1,218 $1,301 $96 [$89, $103] 8.0% [7.5%, 8.4%]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
usage $0-$20k 17.0% 8.88 $485 $461 $354 -$132 -27.1%
rank $20k-$40k 20.5% 14.37 $785 $766 $661 -$124 -15.8%
method $40k-$60k 18.0% 16.15 $883 $865 $768 -$115 -13.0%
$60k-$100k 23.6% 20.67 $1,130 $1,124 $1,042 -$87 -7.7%
>$100k 20.9% 33.52 $1,832 $1,893 $2,259 $427 23.3%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers, all on no-CARE-program rates from table 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Distribution of w* for weighted rank method A Distribution of w* for weighted rank method B
(calibrated from ecological regression results) (calibrated from American Community Survey)
Point Estimate 0.21 Point Estimate 0.10
Mean of bootstrap 0.23 Mean of bootstrap 0.10
Median of bootstrap 0.23 Median of bootstrap 0.10
95% conf interval [0.07,0.38] 95% conf interval [0.07,0.12]
Table 4: PG&E Average Bill By Income Bracket Under Benchmark and Alternative Flat-Rate Tariﬀ
Using Random-Rank, Usage-Rank and Weighted-Rank Within-CBG Allocation Methods
     Monetary Bill Chage Percentage Bill Chage
    Average Annualized Bill      from No-CARE/Flat      from No-CARE/Flat
Share         No-CARE        with CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE
Income on Flat 2-tier 5-tier Flat 2-tier 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier
Range CARE Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
weighted $0-$20k 64.9% $799 $782 $701 $587 $577 $545 -$98 -$212 -$254 -12% -27% -32%
rank $20k-$40k 38.6% $958 $949 $899 $854 $847 $811 -$59 -$104 -$147 -6% -11% -15%
method A $40k-$60k 9.1% $1,042 $1,040 $1,023 $1,085 $1,080 $1,050 -$19 $43 $8 -2% 4% 1%
$60k-$100k 1.0% $1,095 $1,098 $1,106 $1,193 $1,192 $1,182 $11 $98 $88 1% 9% 8%
>$100k 0.0% $1,310 $1,331 $1,451 $1,437 $1,456 $1,555 $141 $127 $245 11% 10% 19%
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
weighted $0-$20k 64.9% $892 $879 $816 $673 $667 $645 -$76 -$219 -$247 -9% -25% -28%
rank $20k-$40k 38.6% $999 $994 $962 $904 $901 $883 -$38 -$95 -$117 -4% -9% -12%
method B $40k-$60k 9.1% $1,048 $1,047 $1,037 $1,099 $1,096 $1,076 -$11 $51 $28 -1% 5% 3%
$60k-$100k 1.0% $1,082 $1,084 $1,092 $1,179 $1,179 $1,170 $10 $98 $88 1% 9% 8%
>$100k 0.0% $1,204 $1,218 $1,301 $1,321 $1,333 $1,396 $96 $117 $191 8% 10% 16%
All results are from weighted rank method
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers
Table 6: PG&E Estimated Average Annual Bills With and Without IBP and CARE
43MC=0.0998 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                          
$0-$20k 17.0% $98 $79 $59 $38 $71 $57 $43 $27
$20k-$40k 20.5% $59 $35 $8 -$21 $52 $18 -$11 -$42
$40k-$60k 18.0% $19 -$10 -$42 -$76 $14 -$8 -$32 -$59
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$11 -$43 -$78 -$116 -$11 -$43 -$78 -$117
>$100k 20.9% -$141 -$185 -$232 -$285 -$126 -$165 -$207 -$254
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $141 $286 $444
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 1.87 8.94 -29.84
Flat-rate Price $0.1498 $0.1481 $0.1464 $0.1445
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                          
MC=0.1498 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                          
$0-$20k 17.0% $98 $88 $77 $67 $71 $64 $56 $48
$20k-$40k 20.5% $59 $45 $30 $14 $52 $39 $26 $13
$40k-$60k 18.0% $19 $1 -$17 -$36 $14 $1 -$13 -$28
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$11 -$31 -$52 -$73 -$11 -$31 -$52 -$74
>$100k 20.9% -$141 -$170 -$201 -$233 -$126 -$152 -$179 -$207
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $80 $162 $248
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.77 1.97 4.06
Flat-rate Price $0.1498 $0.1498 $0.1498 $0.1498
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                          
MC=0.1998 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                          
$0-$20k 17.0% $98 $96 $93 $91 $71 $69 $68 $66
$20k-$40k 20.5% $59 $55 $50 $44 $52 $48 $43 $39
$40k-$60k 18.0% $19 $12 $4 -$4 $14 $9 $3 -$3
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$11 -$20 -$29 -$38 -$11 -$20 -$29 -$39
>$100k 20.9% -$141 -$157 -$173 -$189 -$126 -$140 -$154 -$169
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $34 $69 $106
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.29 0.62 1.01
Flat-rate Price $0.1498 $0.1511 $0.1526 $0.1540
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                          
MC=0.2498 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                          
$0-$20k 17.0% $98 $103 $107 $111 $71 $75 $78 $80
$20k-$40k 20.5% $59 $64 $67 $69 $52 $56 $58 $60
$40k-$60k 18.0% $19 $21 $23 $24 $14 $16 $18 $19
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$11 -$9 -$9 -$9 -$11 -$9 -$9 -$9
>$100k 20.9% -$141 -$144 -$148 -$153 -$126 -$129 -$132 -$136
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 -$9 -$13 -$14
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10
Flat-rate Price $0.1498 $0.1525 $0.1552 $0.1577
Table 5: PG&E Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from Flat-rate
to 5-tier Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
44MC=0.0.998 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                         
$0-$20k 17.0% $212 $217 $224 $231 $154 $158 $162 $167
$20k-$40k 20.5% $104 $107 $110 $113 $91 $93 $96 $99
$40k-$60k 18.0% -$43 -$45 -$48 -$52 -$33 -$35 -$37 -$40
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$98 -$103 -$110 -$117 -$99 -$104 -$111 -$118
>$100k 20.9% -$127 -$136 -$146 -$157 -$113 -$121 -$130 -$140
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $9 $19 $31
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.12
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1643 $0.1630 $0.1617 $0.1602
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.0874 $0.0867 $0.0860 $0.0852
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1498 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                         
$0-$20k 17.0% $212 $219 $227 $235 $154 $159 $164 $170
$20k-$40k 20.5% $104 $107 $111 $114 $91 $94 $97 $100
$40k-$60k 18.0% -$43 -$47 -$51 -$56 -$33 -$36 -$39 -$43
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$98 -$105 -$113 -$122 -$99 -$106 -$114 -$124
>$100k 20.9% -$127 -$138 -$151 -$164 -$113 -$123 -$134 -$146
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $13 $27 $42
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.16
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1643 $0.1648 $0.1655 $0.1663
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.0874 $0.0877 $0.0881 $0.0885
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1998 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                         
$0-$20k 17.0% $212 $220 $229 $239 $154 $160 $166 $173
$20k-$40k 20.5% $104 $107 $111 $115 $91 $94 $97 $101
$40k-$60k 18.0% -$43 -$48 -$53 -$59 -$33 -$37 -$41 -$45
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$98 -$107 -$117 -$127 -$99 -$108 -$118 -$128
>$100k 20.9% -$127 -$141 -$155 -$170 -$113 -$125 -$138 -$152
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $16 $33 $51
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.19
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1643 $0.1666 $0.1690 $0.1714
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.0874 $0.0886 $0.0899 $0.0912
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2498 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                         
$0-$20k 17.0% $212 $222 $232 $242 $154 $161 $168 $175
$20k-$40k 20.5% $104 $108 $112 $116 $91 $94 $98 $101
$40k-$60k 18.0% -$43 -$49 -$55 -$61 -$33 -$38 -$42 -$47
$60k-$100k 23.6% -$98 -$109 -$120 -$131 -$99 -$110 -$121 -$132
>$100k 20.9% -$127 -$143 -$159 -$175 -$113 -$127 -$142 -$156
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $20 $39 $59
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.21
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1643 $0.1682 $0.1720 $0.1757
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.0874 $0.0895 $0.0915 $0.0935
Table 7: PG&E Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from No-CARE to w/CARE
With Flat-rate Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
45Appendix B-2: Tables for San Diego Gas & Electric
Tier % of Standard CARE Tier % of Standard
Baseline Residential Low-income Baseline Residential
Quantity Rate Rate Quantity Rate
                                                                                                                                                                            
Actual 2006 tariff (time-weighted average in 2006) Benchmark Five-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1287 $0.1026 1 0-100% $0.1245
2 100%-130% $0.1488 $0.1187 2 100%-130% $0.1446
3 130%-200% $0.2312 $0.1758 3 130%-200% $0.2270
4 200%-300% $0.2401 $0.1764 4 200%-300% $0.2359
5 300%+ $0.2571 $0.1776 5 300%+ $0.2529
_______________________________________ __________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                            
Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with CARE program Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with no CARE program
0%+ $0.1690 $0.1168 0%+ $0.1622
_______________________________________ __________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                            
Alternative Two-Tier Tariff with CARE program Alternative Two-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1565 $0.1115 1 0-100% $0.1508
2 100%+ $0.1846 $0.1316 2 100%+ $0.1779
Table 1: 2006 San Diego Gas & Electric Retail Electricity Rates
Residential
Usage Percentage of Residential Usage CARE/Non-CARE Shares
(million-kWh) t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5 %  U s a g e %  c u s t o m e r s
Non-CARE 6,255 55.5% 10.3% 15.3% 10.0% 8.9% 87.0% 82.4%
CARE 931 73.6% 9.1% 10.4% 4.7% 2.2% 13.0% 17.6%
______________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                       
Percentage of Customers on Each Tier for Marginal Consumption
t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5
Non-CARE 38.9% 13.9% 22.6% 14.5% 10.2%
CARE 59.2% 14.7% 16.8% 6.8% 2.5%
                                                                                                                                                                       
NOTE: reported results drop household accounts with consumption of less than 1 kWh/day
Table 2: Distribution of SDG&E Residential Customer Consumption Across Tariﬀ Tiers
46Average Average       Change from Flat to 5-tier
Income Share of Daily Use  Annualized Bill Dollar Percent
Range Customers (kWh) Flat 2-tier 5-tier Chg 95% conf intvl Change 95% conf intvl
random $0-$20k 16.4% 13.65 $808 $794 $753 -$55 -6.8%
rank $20k-$40k 22.4% 15.00 $888 $879 $852 -$36 -4.1%
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 16.57 $981 $979 $968 -$13 -1.3%
$60k-$100k 23.8% 18.27 $1,082 $1,086 $1,096 $14 1.3%
>$100k 18.5% 21.36 $1,265 $1,285 $1,353 $88 7.0%
                                                                                                                                                                            
weighted $0-$20k 16.4% 12.47 $738 $721 $672 -$66 [-$89, -$27] -9.5% [-16.2%, 3.0%]
rank $20k-$40k 22.4% 14.57 $863 $852 $817 -$45 [-$78, -$32] -5.3% [-10.3%, -3.5%]
method A $40k-$60k 18.9% 16.52 $979 $975 $962 -$16 [-$36, -$13] -1.7% [-3.8%, -1.3%]
$60k-$100k 23.8% 18.42 $1,091 $1,095 $1,105 $14 [$12. $15] 1.3% [1.1%, 1.4%]
>$100k 18.5% 22.79 $1,350 $1,376 $1,462 $112 [$59, $195] 8.1% [5.1%, 11.0%]
weighted $0-$20k 16.4% 12.23 $724 $706 $652 -$72 [-$67, -$79] -10.0% [-11.6%, 8.9%]
rank $20k-$40k 22.4% 14.79 $876 $866 $835 -$41 [-$39, -$46] -4.7% [-5.3%, -4.4%]
method B $40k-$60k 18.9% 16.64 $986 $983 $972 -$14 [-$13, -$14] -1.4% [-1.4%, -1.4%]
$60k-$100k 23.8% 18.35 $1,086 $1,091 $1,101 $14 [$14. $15] 1.3% [1.3%, 1.4%]
>$100k 18.5% 22.71 $1,345 $1,370 $1,454 $109 [$101, $121] 8.1% [7.7%, 8.7%]
                                                                                                                                                                            
usage $0-$20k 16.4% 6.49 $384 $360 $301 -$83 -21.6%
rank $20k-$40k 22.4% 10.63 $630 $604 $530 -$100 -15.9%
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 13.44 $796 $770 $688 -$108 -13.5%
$60k-$100k 23.8% 19.18 $1,136 $1,132 $1,089 -$47 -4.1%
>$100k 18.5% 35.02 $2,074 $2,157 $2,438 $364 17.6%
                                                                                                                                                                            
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers, all on no-CARE-program rates from table 1 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Distribution of w* for weighted rank method A Distribution of w* for weighted rank method B
(calibrated from ecological regression results) (calibrated from American Community Survey)
Point Estimate 0.08 Point Estimate 0.10
Mean of bootstrap 0.09 Mean of bootstrap 0.11
Median of bootstrap 0.07 Median of bootstrap 0.10
95% conf interval [-0.20,0.38] 95% conf interval [0.07,0.16]
Table 4: SDG&E Average Bill By Income Bracket Under Benchmark and Alternative Flat-Rate Tariﬀ
Using Random-Rank, Usage-Rank and Weighted-Rank Within-CBG Allocation Methods
     Monetary Bill Chage Percentage Bill Chage
    Average Annualized Bill      from No-CARE/Flat      from No-CARE/Flat
Share         No-CARE        with CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE
Income on Flat 2-tier 5-tier Flat 2-tier 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier
Range CARE Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
weighted $0-$20k 58.5% $738 $721 $672 $639 $631 $612 -$66 -$99 -$126 -9% -13% -17%
rank $20k-$40k 30.6% $863 $852 $817 $822 $815 $792 -$45 -$41 -$71 -5% -5% -8%
method A $40k-$60k 5.1% $979 $975 $962 $1,004 $998 $977 -$16 $25 -$1 -2% 3% 0%
$60k-$100k 0.6% $1,091 $1,095 $1,105 $1,134 $1,134 $1,131 $14 $43 $40 1% 4% 4%
>$100k 0.0% $1,350 $1,376 $1,462 $1,406 $1,427 $1,497 $112 $56 $147 8% 4% 11%
                                                                                                                                                                            
weighted $0-$20k 58.5% $724 $706 $652 $624 $615 $591 -$72 -$101 -$133 -10% -14% -18%
rank $20k-$40k 30.6% $876 $866 $835 $836 $830 $810 -$41 -$39 -$66 -5% -4% -8%
method B $40k-$60k 5.1% $986 $983 $972 $1,011 $1,006 $987 -$14 $26 $2 -1% 3% 0%
$60k-$100k 0.6% $1,086 $1,091 $1,101 $1,129 $1,129 $1,127 $14 $43 $41 1% 4% 4%
>$100k 0.0% $1,345 $1,370 $1,454 $1,401 $1,421 $1,488 $109 $56 $144 8% 4% 11%
All results are from weighted rank method
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers
Table 6: SDG&E Estimated Average Annual Bills With and Without IBP and CARE
47MC=0.1122 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
$0-$20k 16.4% $66 $58 $48 $39 $13 $11 $9 $7
$20k-$40k 22.4% $45 $35 $23 $11 $12 $18 -$11 -$42
$40k-$60k 18.9% $16 $3 -$11 -$25 $4 $1 -$2 -$6
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$14 -$29 -$45 -$62 -$4 -$8 -$12 -$17
>$100k 18.5% -$112 -$132 -$154 -$177 -$24 -$28 -$33 -$38
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $7 $49 $96
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.24 -27.18 -2.74
Flat-rate Price $0.1622 $0.1612 $0.1601 $0.1588
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1622 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 16.4% $66 $62 $59 $55 $13 $12 $11 $10
$20k-$40k 22.4% $45 $40 $35 $30 $12 $10 $9 $8
$40k-$60k 18.9% $16 $10 $3 -$3 $4 $2 $1 -$1
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$14 -$22 -$29 -$37 -$4 -$6 -$8 -$10
>$100k 18.5% -$112 -$123 -$134 -$146 -$24 -$26 -$29 -$31
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $8 $16 $24
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.35 0.77 1.31
Flat-rate Price $0.1622 $0.1622 $0.1622 $0.1622
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2122 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 16.4% $66 $67 $68 $68 $13 $13 $13 $13
$20k-$40k 22.4% $45 $46 $46 $46 $12 $12 $12 $12
$40k-$60k 18.9% $16 $16 $16 $16 $4 $4 $3 $3
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$14 -$15 -$15 -$16 -$4 -$4 -$4 -$4
>$100k 18.5% -$112 -$114 -$117 -$119 -$24 -$24 -$25 -$25
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $0 $1 $2
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06
Flat-rate Price $0.1622 $0.1633 $0.1643 $0.1652
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2622 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 16.4% $66 $71 $76 $80 $13 $14 $14 $15
$20k-$40k 22.4% $45 $51 $56 $60 $12 $13 $14 $16
$40k-$60k 18.9% $16 $22 $27 $31 $4 $5 $6 $7
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$14 -$8 -$3 $2 -$4 -$2 -$1 $0
>$100k 18.5% -$112 -$106 -$101 -$96 -$24 -$23 -$22 -$21
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 -$7 -$12 -$17
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 -0.25 -0.43 -0.57
Flat-rate Price $0.1622 $0.1643 $0.1661 $0.1677
Table 5: SDG&E Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from Flat-rate
to 5-tier Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
48MC=0.1122 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 16.4% $99 $101 $102 $103 $19 $19 $19 $20
$20k-$40k 22.4% $41 $41 $42 $42 $11 $11 $11 $11
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$25 -$26 -$27 -$28 -$6 -$6 -$6 -$6
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$43 -$44 -$46 -$48 -$12 -$12 -$13 -$13
>$100k 18.5% -$56 -$58 -$61 -$63 -$12 -$12 -$13 -$14
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $1 $1 $2
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1690 $0.1680 $0.1669 $0.1658
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1168 $0.1161 $0.1154 $0.1146
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1622 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
$0-$20k 16.4% $99 $101 $103 $105 $19 $19 $20 $20
$20k-$40k 22.4% $41 $41 $42 $43 $11 $11 $11 $11
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$25 -$26 -$28 -$29 -$6 -$6 -$6 -$6
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$43 -$45 -$47 -$49 -$12 -$12 -$13 -$13
>$100k 18.5% -$56 -$59 -$62 -$65 -$12 -$13 -$13 -$14
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $1 $2 $3
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1690 $0.1692 $0.1693 $0.1695
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1168 $0.1169 $0.1170 $0.1171
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2122 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
$0-$20k 16.4% $99 $102 $104 $106 $19 $19 $20 $20
$20k-$40k 22.4% $41 $41 $42 $43 $11 $11 $11 $11
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$25 -$27 -$28 -$29 -$6 -$6 -$6 -$6
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$43 -$45 -$48 -$50 -$12 -$12 -$13 -$14
>$100k 18.5% -$56 -$59 -$63 -$66 -$12 -$13 -$13 -$14
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $1 $2 $3
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1690 $0.1703 $0.1715 $0.1726
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1168 $0.1177 $0.1185 $0.1193
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2622 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 16.4% $99 $102 $104 $106 $19 $19 $20 $20
$20k-$40k 22.4% $41 $41 $42 $43 $11 $11 $11 $11
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$25 -$27 -$29 -$30 -$6 -$6 -$6 -$7
$60k-$100k 23.8% -$43 -$46 -$48 -$51 -$12 -$13 -$13 -$14
>$100k 18.5% -$56 -$60 -$64 -$67 -$12 -$13 -$14 -$14
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $1 $3 $4
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1690 $0.1713 $0.1734 $0.1752
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1168 $0.1184 $0.1198 $0.1211
Table 7: SDG&E Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from No-CARE to w/CARE
With Flat-rate Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
49Appendix B-3: Tables for Southern California Edison
% of Standard CARE % of Standard
Baseline Residential Low-income Baseline Residential
Tier Quantity Rate Rate Tier Quantity Rate
                                                                                                                                                             
Actual 2006 tariff (time-weighted average in 2006) Benchmark Five-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1162 $0.0834 1 0-100% $0.1069
2 100%-130% $0.1361 $0.1053 2 100%-130% $0.1268
3 130%-200% $0.2201 $0.1691 3 130%-200% $0.2108
4 200%-300% $0.3049 $0.1717 4 200%-300% $0.2956
5 300%+ $0.3049 $0.1717 5 300%+ $0.2956
                                      _______________________________________ ________________________
                                                                                                                                                             
Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with CARE program Alternative Flat-Rate Tariff with no CARE program
0%+ $0.1731 $0.1060 0%+ $0.1592
                                      _______________________________________ __________________________________
                                                                                                                                                             
Alternative Two-Tier Tariff with CARE program  Alternative Two-Tier Tariff with no CARE program
1 0-100% $0.1595 $0.0999 1 0-100% $0.1474
2 100%+ $0.1883 $0.1179 2 100%+ $0.1739
Table 1: 2006 Southern California Edison Retail Electricity Rates
Residential
Usage Percentage of Residential Usage CARE/Non-CARE Shares
(million-kWh) t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5 %  U s a g e %  c u s t o m e r s
Non-CARE 23,046 52.9% 10.7% 16.5% 10.9% 9.0% 79.3% 74.8%
CARE 6,016 66.0% 10.7% 13.5% 6.7% 3.1% 20.7% 25.2%
                                        ______________________________________
                                                                                                                                                             
Percentage of Customers on Each Tier for Marginal Consumption
t i e r  1t i e r  2t i e r  3t i e r  4t i e r  5
Non-CARE 32.4% 14.2% 25.0% 17.2% 11.3%
CARE 45.4% 16.7% 22.7% 10.9% 4.3%
                                                                                                                                                             
NOTE: reported results drop household accounts with consumption of less than 1 kWh/day
Table 2: Distribution of SCE Residential Customer Consumption Across Tariﬀ Tiers
50Average Average       Change from Flat to 5-tier
Income Share of Daily Use  Annualized Bill Dollar Percent
Range Customers (kWh) Flat 2-tier 5-tier Chg 95% conf intvl Change 95% conf intvl
random $0-$20k 17.9% 16.98 $986 $974 $908 -$78 -8.0%
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 17.93 $1,041 $1,033 $985 -$57 -5.5%
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.34 $1,124 $1,121 $1,104 -$19 -1.7%
$60k-$100k 23.7% 20.86 $1,212 $1,217 $1,237 $25 2.0%
>$100k 17.4% 23.85 $1,386 $1,406 $1,527 $141 10.2%
                                                                                                                                                                                
weighted $0-$20k 17.9% 13.66 $794 $771 $665 -$129 [-$146, -$92] -16.5% [-21.3%, -9.7%]
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 16.80 $976 $962 $884 -$92 [-$119,-$58] -9.5% [-12.9%, -5.6%]
method A $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.31 $1,122 $1,118 $1,090 -$32 [-$66, -$18] -2.9% [-6.1%, -1.6%]
$60k-$100k 23.7% 21.27 $1,236 $1,241 $1,261 $25 [$19. $26] 2.0% [1.5%, 2.2%]
>$100k 17.4% 28.19 $1,638 $1,675 $1,889 $251 [$155, $347] 15.2% [10.9%, 19.0%]
weighted $0-$20k 17.9% 15.20 $883 $865 $772 -$111 [-$116, -$106] -12.6% [-13.3%, -11.8%]
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 17.57 $1,021 $1,010 $953 -$68 [-$71, -$64] -6.6% [-7.0%, -6.2%]
method B $40k-$60k 18.9% 19.55 $1,136 $1,134 $1,117 -$19 [-$19, -$18] -1.6% [-1.7%, -1.6%]
$60k-$100k 23.7% 20.97 $1,218 $1,223 $1,244 $26 [$26, $26] 2.2% [2.1%, 2.2%]
>$100k 17.4% 25.76 $1,496 $1,524 $1,682 $186 [$176, $195] 12.4% [11.9%, 12.8%]
                                                                                                                                                                                
usage $0-$20k 17.9% 8.85 $514 $485 $365 -$149 -28.9%
rank $20k-$40k 22.1% 14.56 $846 $822 $696 -$150 -17.7%
method $40k-$60k 18.9% 16.61 $965 $944 $834 -$131 -13.6%
$60k-$100k 23.7% 21.90 $1,272 $1,271 $1,201 -$72 -5.6%
>$100k 17.4% 38.08 $2,212 $2,297 $2,797 $585 26.4%
                                                                                                                                                                                
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers, all on no-CARE-program rates from table 1 
Distribution of w* for weighted rank method A Distribution of w* for weighted rank method B
(calibrated from ecological regression results) (calibrated from American Community Survey)
Point Estimate 0.27 Point Estimate 0.13
Mean of bootstrap 0.27 Mean of bootstrap 0.14
Median of bootstrap 0.28 Median of bootstrap 0.14
95% conf interval [0.06,0.44] 95% conf interval [0.11,0.16]
Table 4: SCE Average Bill By Income Bracket Under Benchmark and Alternative Flat-Rate Tariﬀ
Using Random-Rank, Usage-Rank and Weighted-Rank Within-CBG Allocation Methods
     Monetary Bill Chage Percentage Bill Chage
    Average Annualized Bill      from No-CARE/Flat      from No-CARE/Flat
Share         No-CARE        with CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE No-CARE w/CARE w/CARE
Income on Flat 2-tier 5-tier Flat 2-tier 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier 5-tier Flat 5-tier
Range CARE Tariff tariff Tariff Tariff tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
weighted $0-$20k 69.9% $794 $771 $665 $618 $606 $558 -$129 -$176 -$236 -16% -22% -30%
rank $20k-$40k 47.1% $976 $962 $884 $865 $856 $808 -$92 -$111 -$168 -9% -11% -17%
method A $40k-$60k 11.3% $1,122 $1,119 $1,090 $1,158 $1,151 $1,108 -$32 $36 -$15 -3% 3% -1%
$60k-$100k 0.6% $1,236 $1,241 $1,261 $1,339 $1,338 $1,328 $25 $103 $92 2% 8% 7%
>$100k 0.0% $1,638 $1,675 $1,889 $1,781 $1,813 $1,985 $251 $143 $347 15% 9% 21%
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
weighted $0-$20k 69.9% $883 $865 $772 $699 $690 $654 -$112 -$184 -$229 -13% -21% -26%
rank $20k-$40k 47.1% $1,021 $1,010 $953 $920 $914 $885 -$68 -$101 -$136 -7% -10% -13%
method B $40k-$60k 11.3% $1,136 $1,134 $1,117 $1,181 $1,176 $1,144 -$18 $45 $8 -2% 4% 1%
$60k-$100k 0.6% $1,218 $1,223 $1,244 $1,320 $1,320 $1,312 $26 $102 $93 2% 8% 8%
>$100k 0.0% $1,496 $1,524 $1,682 $1,627 $1,650 $1,770 $186 $131 $273 12% 9% 18%
All results are from weighted rank method
Excludes bills with daily consumption < 1kWh/day
Includes all CARE and non-CARE customers
Table 6: SCE Estimated Average Annual Bills With and Without IBP and CARE
51MC=0.1092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $114 $97 $80 $93 $82 $70 $58
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $71 $49 $25 $82 $64 $44 $22
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $5 -$23 -$54 $24 $4 -$18 -$41
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$56 -$89 -$126 -$24 -$53 -$85 -$120
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$298 -$348 -$403 -$177 -$210 -$245 -$284
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $113 $234 $365
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.77 2.05 4.56
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1577 $0.1560 $0.1543
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $121 $113 $105 $93 $88 $82 $76
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $81 $69 $57 $82 $72 $62 $51
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $16 $1 -$16 $24 $13 $0 -$12
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$44 -$63 -$83 -$24 -$42 -$60 -$79
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$281 -$313 -$345 -$177 -$198 -$220 -$243
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $67 $136 $207
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.42 0.95 1.63
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1592 $0.1592 $0.1592
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $128 $128 $128 $93 $93 $92 $92
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $90 $87 $87 $82 $80 $78 $78
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $27 $21 $21 $24 $20 $16 $16
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$32 -$40 -$40 -$24 -$31 -$38 -$38
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$266 -$281 -$281 -$177 -$187 -$198 -$198
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 $24 $49 $49
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.29
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1606 $0.1620 $0.1633
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From Switch to 5-tier tariff From Switch to 5-tier tariff
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                            
$0-$20k 17.9% $129 $135 $140 $144 $93 $98 $101 $104
$20k-$40k 22.1% $92 $98 $103 $107 $82 $88 $92 $95
$40k-$60k 18.9% $32 $37 $40 $43 $24 $28 $31 $33
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$25 -$21 -$19 -$17 -$24 -$20 -$18 -$16
>$100k 17.4% -$251 -$251 -$253 -$255 -$177 -$177 -$178 -$179
                                                                                                                                                            
Aggregate Increase in DWL from IBP ($M/yr) $0 -$16 -$28 -$37
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.18
Flat-rate Price $0.1592 $0.1619 $0.1645 $0.1669
Table 5: SCE Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from Flat-rate
to 5-tier Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
52MC=0.1092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $178 $182 $186 $127 $129 $131 $134
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $114 $117 $120 $99 $102 $104 $107
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$37 -$38 -$40 -$27 -$28 -$29 -$30
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$108 -$113 -$118 -$99 -$103 -$108 -$113
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$151 -$160 -$171 -$101 -$106 -$113 -$120
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $7 $14 $22
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1717 $0.1703 $0.1687
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1052 $0.1043 $0.1033
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.1592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $180 $184 $189 $127 $130 $133 $137
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $114 $118 $122 $99 $102 $105 $109
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$38 -$40 -$42 -$27 -$29 -$30 -$32
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$109 -$116 -$123 -$99 -$104 -$111 -$117
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$154 -$165 -$177 -$101 -$108 -$116 -$125
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $9 $19 $29
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1735 $0.1739 $0.1743
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1062 $0.1065 $0.1067
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2092 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $181 $186 $192 $127 $131 $135 $139
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $115 $119 $123 $99 $102 $106 $110
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$38 -$41 -$44 -$27 -$29 -$31 -$34
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$111 -$118 -$127 -$99 -$106 -$113 -$121
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$156 -$169 -$182 -$101 -$110 -$119 -$128
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $11 $23 $34
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.14
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1751 $0.1771 $0.1790
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1072 $0.1085 $0.1096
_______________________                                                                                                                                            
MC=0.2592 Change in Annual Average Change in Aggregate
Household Consumer Surplus Annual Consumer Surplus ($M/yr)
Income Share of From adding CARE program From adding CARE program
Range Customers ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3 ε=0 ε=-0.1 ε=-0.2 ε=-0.3
                                                                                                                                                                                        
$0-$20k 17.9% $176 $182 $188 $194 $127 $132 $136 $140
$20k-$40k 22.1% $111 $115 $119 $124 $99 $103 $107 $111
$40k-$60k 18.9% -$36 -$39 -$43 -$46 -$27 -$30 -$32 -$35
$60k-$100k 23.7% -$103 -$112 -$121 -$130 -$99 -$107 -$116 -$124
>$100k 17.4% -$143 -$158 -$172 -$187 -$101 -$111 -$121 -$131
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aggregate Increase in DWL from CARE ($M/yr) $0 $14 $27 $39
Ratio of DWL to transfers to two lowest income brackets 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.16
Flat-rate Price - Standard Residential $0.1731 $0.1767 $0.1800 $0.1831
Flat-rate Price - CARE participants $0.1060 $0.1082 $0.1102 $0.1121
Table 7: SCE Change in Consumer Surplus Switching from No-CARE to w/CARE
With Flat-rate Tariﬀ Under Alternative Demand Elasticities
(Weighted Ranking Method A - calibration from ecological regression)
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